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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
EVALUATING WATER MANAGEMENT POLICY IN SAUDI ARABIA USING A 
BILEVEL, MULTI-OBJECTIVE, MULTI-FOLLOWER PROGRAMMING 
APPROACH 
 
 
Over the past five decades, the Saudi government has adopted many agricultural 
policies aimed to: achieve self-sufficiency of food, increase the participation of the 
agricultural sector in the economy, and reduce the consumption of irrigation water. Due 
to conflicts among government objectives and the incompatibility of farmers' objectives 
with those of some agricultural policies, the government has not been able to fully 
achieve its objectives.  
To accomplish its goals the government, or decision maker needs to understand 
the farmer, or follower, reaction when s/he adopts a new decision. The dissertation aims 
to build a model that achieves government goals of minimizing the total irrigation water 
used while improving the total revenue from agricultural production, while incorporating 
farmers’ objective of maximizing their profit. To do this, linear programming and bi-level 
multi-objective multi-follower models are developed and applied to six regions of Saudi 
Arabia, which account for around 70 percent of cropland and consume about 13.131 
BCM of irrigation water per year. 
The result of the linear programming model appied to the Riyadh region shows 
there is an unobserved factor effect on the farmers’ decisions, including irrigation water 
demand that comes from the presence of indirect subsidies. On  the other hand, the bi-
level multi-objective, multi-follower model shows there is the possibility to minimize 
irrigation water consumption while maintaining current total revenue from crop 
production through reallocating irrigation water among regions, while applying a variety 
of crop specific tax and subsidy policies among the regions to alter planting decisions. 
 
KEYWORDS: Bi-level multi-objective multi-follower programming, Saudi Government, 
Follower, Algorithm, Irrigation water, Agricultural policies.  
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  INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1.
1.1. Problem Statement 
 Over the past four decades (1970-2010), the Saudi government has attempted to 
lead the agricultural sector to achieve food security, reduce the use of irrigation water, 
diversify the economy, and improve the welfare of citizens. To achieve these objectives 
of the government requires a better allocation of available resources. In particular, the 
government has adopted different types of agricultural policy (e.g., support prices, input 
subsidies and the distribution of free cropland) to achieve a better balancing among the 
two goals of increasing food security and reducing the use of irrigation water. 
Unfortunately, some of the policies did not help improve the balance among these 
objectives, and there are two reasons for this failing. First, some of the policies are 
consistent with some goals, while they conflict with others. Second, the government 
objectives can conflict with the farmers’ goals of maximizing their profits. When this 
happens policies chosen by the government induce farmers to behave in ways that the 
government did not anticipate and does not desire.  
 In the last four decades, while the demand for irrigation water has increased over 
time, it has also fluctuated significantly in response to many factors, particularly shifts in 
government agricultural policies. Some of the forces that have increased irrigation water 
demand include, increases in the total amount of cropland, changes in crop patterns, and 
changes in the quality of available irrigation water. Underlying these changes are shifts in 
government policy that favor the production of some crops over others, and changes in 
other forms of support for farmers.  
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 Saudi agricultural policy faces two key challenges. The first is an inherent conflict 
between the desire to increase food self-sufficiency, in an environment where irrigation is 
required for the vast majority of crop production, and the desire to reduce the rate of 
groundwater extraction. While greater efficiencies in water use can be achieved, at some 
point producing more food leads to greater water use. The second challenge is a classic 
Principal-Agent problem, in that both Saudi government goals can only be achieved 
through the appropriate actions of farmers who choose both the amount of various crops 
to produce and how much water to apply to them.  Farmers have no direct interest in 
either national goal, and instead can be thought of as individual profit maximizers. To 
achieve its goals the Saudi government must develop policies that alter the incentives 
farmers face in ways that motivate them to make profit maximizing choice that are 
compatible with government objectives. 
 Some agricultural policies and regulations are consistent with some goals; but 
conflict with others. For instance, the wheat support price policy led to reaching self-
sufficiency for wheat, satisfying the food security goal and increasing farmers’ incomes. 
On the other hand, the policy conflicted with the goal of reducing irrigation water use 
because it encouraged farmers to expand the amount of land in wheat, which increased 
the demand for irrigation water. In 1990 wheat cropland was 770.6 thousand hectares, 
and represented 55.9 percent of the total farmland. At the same time irrigation water 
demand grew from 6108 MCM in 1970 to 18,000 MCM in 1990, which means the water 
demand tripled over ten years (MOWE, 2012). In this case, it is clear the government 
could not reach a balance between achieving self-sufficiency in wheat and reducing the 
irrigation water used. In response, the Saudi government in 2005 reduce the support price 
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for wheat to SAR 1000 (266.66 USD) to force the farmers to reduce the irrigation water 
demand, but this policy leads to reduce the farmer’s income and less self-sufficiency. 
 The dissertation will address the two policy challenges by developing a multi-
objective optimization model that incorporates the two government goals of improved 
food self-sufficiency and reduced irrigation water consumption. The model also 
incorporated the Principal-Agent challenge by having two levels of decision-makers. 
Government chooses a desired combination of irrigation water consumption and food 
security, and is able control the amount of water extracted by farmers. But, without also 
creating a set of policy incentives for farmers, that leads them to produce the desired mix 
of crop outputs it is impossible to satisfy the government’s food security objective.  The 
dissertation shows that with an appropriate set of policy incentives the government can 
achieve various combinations of food security and irrigation water use, with the potential 
to achieve current levels of food security while using significantly less water.  
1.2. The objective of the research 
 The main objective of the dissertation is to contribute to solving the problem of 
reducing the demand for irrigation water used while achieving an acceptable level of food 
security. Over recent decades the Saudi government has adopted a variety of policies that 
have increased agricultural output , but that have often led to more irrigation water use 
than was initially anticipated. The government then reverses its policies to reduce water 
demand, but this can lead to a reduction in food security. While at a certain level there 
can be a direct conflict between the two goals of water use and food security, the main 
hypothesis of the dissertation is that the problem is largely a consequence of the use of an 
inappropriate set of policy tools to address the two problem of, conflicting objectives 
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among policies and misaligned incentives between government and farmers. With more 
appropriate policies it should be possible to provide incentives to fares that lead to 
satisfying food security objectives and reducing irrigation water consumption.  
 The specific objectives of the dissertation are 
1. Develop a regional model to provide the best crop mix at the regional level that 
leads to maximizing the net return on activities using groundwater, and 
understand why there are differences between the optimized crop pattern and the 
current crop pattern. One of the most important causes of the difference may be 
the unobserved subsidies. Initially, the model is applied to the Riyadh region and 
assuming the region is a single farm, where the farmer is the decision maker and 
has a perfect profit maximizing objective. 
2. Develop a national model that aims to explore the best crop mix for six regions in 
Saudi Arabia by allocating limited farmland and limited groundwater to achieve 
the government objectives, which is the balancing among minimizing irrigation 
water consumption and maximizing total farm revenue. The dissertation uses the 
total revenue as a proxy to measure the acceptable level of food security. Thus, 
the national model would help the government identify integrated policies that 
lead to reduced consumption of irrigation water and that maximize the total farm's 
revenue. 
1.3. Approach Followed 
 The main assumption is that the government can control the distribution of 
irrigation water between regions. Also, the government is fully aware of the level of food 
security required. On the other hand, the government has to understand the farmer’s 
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decision-making process since it relies on the farmers to produce crops. Therefore, the 
dissertation uses two types of model to contribute to solving the problem of reducing 
irrigation water used while achieving an acceptable level of food security. The first model 
is the regional model while the second is a national model. 
 The regional model aims to find the optimal crop pattern that maximizes the 
farm’s profit. The regional model is a part of the national model. The regional model 
calibrated using the Riyadh region because it has the largest cropland among regions. The 
primary irrigation water resource in Riyadh is groundwater and Riyadh has multiple 
aquifers. Therefore, the quality of irrigation water varies among aquifers. An average 
levels of salinity is used when calculating crop specific gross irrigation water 
requirements. Initial model results showed a significant gap between historic average 
levels of output and estimated outputs for a few major crops. To resolve this problem new 
prices for these crops were calculated that incorporate the benefit from various subsidies 
that farmers receive. These adjusted prices result in a crop output pattern that is similar to 
the historic average. This new price set is used in the national model. 
 The national model covers six regions, where non-renewable groundwater is the 
main source of irrigation water. This model has two levels of decision makers. The upper 
level, or the leader, is the government, while the lower level, or the followers, is the 
regions. The model assumes each region is a single large farm and the farm’s objective is 
maximizing profit. Thus, there are seven optimization problems. The first problem, or the 
master problem, belongs to the government. The rest of the problems belong the regions. 
Crucially the government must rely on eh actions of the regions if it is to satisfy its 
objectives, but the regions do not take government objectives into account when solving 
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their individual problems. The government’s problem has two objectives: the first 
objective is minimizing total irrigation water consumed, while the second objective is 
maximizing the total agricultural revenue, although in the empirical model this objective 
enters as a constraint.  
 Total agricultural revenue is used as a proxy for the acceptable level of food 
security. Clearly, measuring the actual level of food security is a complex issue that 
involves both the stock of locally produced and imported food, and the ability of 
households to purchase available food. However, Saudi food security policy mainly 
focuses on the level of self-supply, and given that the mix of crops will vary from 
scenario to scenario, a revenue measure is preferred since it allows direct comparisons of 
self-supply levels across scenarios. Total revenue is estimated using levels of crop output 
in each region, while market prices are based on wholesale prices for crops that are not 
imported and import prices for those crops where imports are common.  
 The solution mechanics start with the government solving the master problem to 
minimize irrigation water used, while holding total revenue at some target level. This 
solution assures the government that a feasible production set exists. The government 
then allocates a maximum water use level to each region that reflects its solution. Then, 
the region takes the given amount of irrigation water and optimizes net farm income, or 
profit, from crop production.  
Two different algorithms are used to solve the problem. The first algorithm, 
named ‘Reallocated Irrigation Water Policy’ (RIWP), applies uniform prices across all 
regions, and relies only on the restriction on water use to modify farmers’ behavior. . A 
second algorithm, named ‘Integrated Irrigation Water Management Policy’ (IIWMP), 
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introduces region specific prices that provide an additional signal to producers to adjust 
planting decisions if they either over or under produce specific crops when compared to 
the government’s desired crop pattern.  These ad valorem taxes or subsidies are applied 
in cases of over or under production as price signals to alter the crop distribution in each 
region.  
1.4. Dissertation Overview 
 The balance of the dissertation consists of four chapters. The second chapter 
provides a background on Saudi Arabia. This background includes Saudi Arabia's water 
resources, developing the agricultural sector in a region has limited water resources and 
the agricultural policies that adopted by the government to raise the agricultural sector 
contribution in the national economy. The third chapter provides the methodology, which 
contains the regional model, national model, and data requirements. The regional model 
follows a standard linear programming model of agricultural production that is calibrated 
as a single profit-maximizing enterprise using one of the large regions (Riyadh) that 
depend on groundwater. This model is then extended to 5 other major regions. The 
second model is the national model that include six regions in Saudi Arabia with multiple 
crops produced and a national government sector that sets its own goals and policies. The 
national model follows a bi-level, multi-objective, multi-follower optimization structure. 
Once the data requirements are specified the actual empirical models structures are 
described, but model results are discussed in the next chapter. Chapter Four presents the 
results of the regional and national models. The regional model result shows the optimal 
crop pattern and the indirect subsidies estimation. The national model result shows four 
scenarios through two level of total revenue and two algorithms. Chapter Five discusses 
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the result of the regional and national model, such as why the regional model shows the 
gap between the current crop pattern and optimal crop pattern and why the indirect 
subsidies estimation is the better interpretation. Finally, Chapter Five provides the 
conclusions, and addressees limitations and opportunities for future work. 
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  INTRODUCTION TO AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND WATER CHAPTER 2.
RESOURCES IN SAUDI ARABIA 
2.1. Introduction 
 This second chapter provides a brief overview of the context for agricultural 
development in Saudi Arabia. It describes the water demand situation and how 
agricultural policies that have led agricultural sector development, have caused an 
increased demand for a limited amount of water. The chapter consists of five main 
sections. It begins with background on Saudi Arabia, which focuses on the fact that Saudi 
Arabia has limited water resources, while there has been considerable growth in water 
demand over time. The agricultural sector’s increasing demand for water is the main 
reason for this. The chapter then describes the main sources of water, namely, rainfall, 
groundwater, and seawater desalination. The government has invested in capturing 
rainfall through building dams, which are used to compensate for groundwater extraction, 
and provide water for irrigation and household consumption. This section also provides 
information on the supply of groundwater, which is divided between renewable and non-
renewable sources, and then discusses seawater desalination that is an important source 
of drinkable water in urban areas. The third section focuses on water users, which are: the 
agricultural sector, the domestic sector, and the industrial sector. However, the 
agricultural sector is the main water user, with its demand for water fluctuating in 
response to variations in government goals and policies. The fourth section covers the 
motivation for agricultural development in Saudi Arabia, and the fifth section covers past 
and current agricultural policies. The government developed the agricultural sector to 
reach several objectives, such as, increasing farmer’s income and diversifying the rural 
economy. To achieve its goals the government used different types of agricultural policy, 
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including: distributing farmland free of charge, introducing price supports, providing 
interest  free loans to farmers, providing input subsidies and using direct payments. 
2.2. Saudi Arabia Background 
Saudi Arabia is located in the arid belt of the earth. Therefore, its summers are 
long, hot, and relatively dry.  The winter season is short and cold with little rain. Annual 
rainfall averages 100 mm, while the annual evaporation is an average of 3,500 mm/year. 
Saudi Arabia also represents 70 percent of the Arabian Peninsula. Its total land area is 
about two million square kilometers (Alsharhan et al., 2001). Moreover, Saudi Arabia 
lacks permanent and renewable surface water resources, such as streams and lakes. Thus, 
among Saudi Arabia’s natural resources, the one with perhaps the highest value and 
social significance is groundwater, which has numerous uses in domestic, agricultural, 
and industrial areas. However, the agricultural sector is the primary consumer of water in 
Saudi Arabia. Limited water supplies have led to 61 percent of the domestic water 
demand being supplied by desalination of sea water in 2015 (M.W.E, 2015). 
Saudi Arabia, like most countries, has a keen interest in food security. Some of its 
food comes from the country’s self-supply, and there is also a historical basis for 
agricultural production near oases that is valuable for cultural and local economic 
development reasons. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has a keen interest to ensure that water is 
available for Saudi people. However, Saudi Arabia faces a significant water constraint: 
most water, most of which is used for agriculture, comes from aquifers with very slow 
recharge rates.  Thus, the water policy and the agricultural policy/food security policy are 
very closely linked. 
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Historically, the Saudi government encouraged Saudi people to participate in 
agricultural development through: high domestic farm prices, easy access to water, and 
money for farm-related investments. As a result, the cultivated area has expanded 
significantly, as shown in Figure 2.1, which has led to an increased demand for irrigation 
water. For instance, since 1971, cropland developed from 418.9 thousand hectors to 1.5 
million hectors in 1994. Subsequently, the demand from the agricultural sector for water 
increased from 1,860 million cubic meters (MCM) in 1980 to 7,430 MCM in 1985 (Al-
Ibrahim, 1990). Consequently, both renewable and non-renewable groundwater has faced 
massive depletion, which is not compatible with their very slow rates of replenishment. 
According to Ghanim and Alrwis (2003) that the agricultural sector depends on non-
renewable groundwater for 66.54% of its water, while its dependence on renewable 
groundwater is 33.46%. 
 
Figure  2-1 the change of Crop Area in Saudi Arabia during the period between 1971-
2014 
 
Total cropland within the current system of agriculture, based on the Agriculture 
Census (2015), is 1.04 million hectors. The agricultural area was utilized as follows: 
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fodder crops represent about 48 percent, cereal crops account for about 31percent, fruit 
accounts for about 12 percent, and vegetables account for about 8 percent. Alfalfa 
occupies the most extensive area among all crops, as it represents 22 percent of the 
cultivated area, while dates trees account for about 10 percent. Moreover, most of the 
crops grown in Saudi Arabia are irrigated by modern irrigation systems, such as drip 
irrigation or sprinkler irrigation, representing about 80 percent of the total irrigated area. 
Specifically, about 86 percent of the grain and feed area is watered by a sprinkler system, 
while a drip method irrigates 58 percent of the fruit area. Also, about 60 percent of the 
vegetables cultivated in open-field areas are irrigated by the modern system, in which a 
drip irrigation system irrigates around 10 percent, and a sprinkler system irrigates about 
70 percent. Table 2.1 presents the percentage of irrigation area of each crop base on the 
irrigation methods. Correspondingly, the Ministry of Environment, Water, and 
Agriculture (MEWA) estimated that the agricultural sector consumed about 20,831 MCM 
of the total water consumed. Thus, even though most cropland is irrigated by high 
efficiency systems, the demand for agricultural irrigation water has increased. Therefore, 
decision makers must address the problem of the increasing demand for irrigation water, 
protect the next generation’s rights to this resource, and provide optimal allocation of 
water resources among various activities, including satisfying the desire for a higher rate 
of food self-sufficiency. 
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Table  2-1 Distributed of crop pattern according to irrigation methods based on a 
percentage 
Crops Surface Drip Sprinkler Rains Other 
Wheat 0.48 0.01 10.51 0.66 0.01 
Barley 0.16 0.02 9.38 0.10 0.00 
Sorghum 1.84 0.03 0.57 3.55 0.03 
Maize 0.01 0.00 0.20 0.02 0.00 
Millet 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.30 0.00 
Sesame 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 
Other Cereal 0.36 0.03 0.65 1.44 0.02 
Tomato (OF) 0.13 0.54 0.31 0.01 0.00 
Tomato (GH) 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Eggplant 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Squash (OF) 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.01 0.00 
Squash (GH) 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cucumber (OF) 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Cucumber (GH) 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Okra 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Carrots 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01 
Potato 0.08 0.29 1.25 0.00 0.01 
Dray onion 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 
Melon 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.06 0.01 
Watermelon 0.14 0.15 0.16 1.87 0.02 
other Vegetable (OF) 0.26 0.21 0.46 0.02 0.01 
Other Vegetable (GH) 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Alfalfa 0.59 0.08 40.49 0.05 0.00 
Other fodder 0.10 0.02 6.43 0.04 0.00 
Dates plum 5.15 5.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Citrus 0.19 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grapes 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other Fruit 0.46 2.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Percent of total area 10.60 10.11 70.97 8.19 0.12 
 Calculated by the author from Agriculture Census (2015) 
2.3. Water Resources in Saudi Arabia 
Identifying the sources of water in Saudi Arabia is essential. Saudi water sources 
include surface water, groundwater, desalinated seawater, treated sewage water, and 
reused agricultural drainage water. Of these, the conventional water resources are surface 
water and groundwater. This section examines the geomorphology of Saudi Arabia, 
particularly the Arabian Shield and the Arabian Shelf. The Arabian Shield is located in 
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the western part of Saudi Arabia and extends from the northwest to the southwest, and it 
covers a third of the Arabian Peninsula. The Arabian Shelf is located east of the Arabian 
Shield and covers two-thirds of the Arabian Peninsula (Figure 2.2). 
 
Figure  2-2 General physiography of Saudi Arabia. 
 (Zone 1 = the eastern coastal plains of the Red Sea; Zone 2 = Escarpment of the Arabian Shield; 
Zone 3 = the central plateau of the Arabian Shelf; Zone 4 = The Arabian Gulf coastal region; and 
the green dots are the city locations). Adopted from Youssef and Norbert (2013) 
Since the country lacks surface resources (e.g., rivers and lakes), the primary 
source of surface water is rainfall. On average, Saudi Arabia receives an estimated 158.47 
billion cubic meters of rainfall annually (MOWE, 2012). When rain falls in the deserts, 
where it is difficult to harvest, the evaporation rate is high. The only part of the rainfall 
that recharges the groundwater is in the Arabian Shelf. Also, according to MOWE 
(2012), the quantity of annual runoff is estimated at 5,000 million cubic meters (MCM), 
with most of this water in the western part of Saudi Arabia. Consequently, the Saudi 
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government built 444 dams, holding a total capacity of 2,017 thousand cubic meters of 
water for irrigation, drinking water, compensation for groundwater extraction and flood 
control. Two dams with 54 thousand cubic meters of water are used for irrigation; 58 
dams with 453 thousand cubic meters are used for drinking water. The rest of the dams 
are designated for compensation and control (MOA, 2014). 
Groundwater is the most critical water source in Saudi Arabia. It is the most 
significant source of domestic water, providing local water supply needs, and that of the 
industrial and agricultural sectors. The groundwater in Saudi Arabia is divided into 
renewable and non-renewable, or fossil, water, which has been stored in different layers 
of the ground for thousands of years. Renewable aquifers are located in the Arabian 
Shield and are called shallow alluvial aquifers. These aquifers recharge when the rainfall 
runs into the valleys. MWE (2012) mentions the renewable aquifers store about 84 BCM 
and have an average annual recharge of 1,196 MCM. 
Fossil or non-renewable groundwater is located in the Arabian shelf. Non-
renewable groundwater is divided into primary or principal aquifers, and secondary 
aquifers. These are categorized based on the volume of water stored in the aquifer, areal 
extent, and the possibility of development. The principal aquifers are Saq, Wajid, Tabuk, 
Minjur, Dhruma, Biyadh, Wasia, Dammam, Umm Er Radhuma, and Neogene. The 
secondary aquifers are Al-Jauf, Al-Khuff, Al-Jilh, the upper Jurassic, Sakaka, the lower 
Cretaceous, Aruma, Basalts, and Wadi Sediments (MWE, 2012). These aquifers are 
distributed throughout Saudi Arabia and extend from the western part to the east (Figure 
2.3). 
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Figure  2-3 Extension of the principle and secondary aquifers in Saudi Arabia (MWE, 
2012). 
Table 2.2 illustrates the principal aquifers and provides the characteristics of each 
aquifer’s extent. The total thickness of these aquifers varies from a few meters, as in the 
Neogene aquifer, to around a thousand meters, as shown in the Tabuk aquifer. On the 
other hand, the quality of the water, which is measured by total dissolved solids (TDS), 
varies from site to site and among the aquifers. The Neogene aquifer, for example, ranges 
from 100 and 4000 TDS part per million (ppm), while the Saq aquifer ranges from 500 to 
1,500 ppm. Groundwater resources are estimated to be 500 billion cubic meters (BCM), 
in which the principal aquifers carry around 337 BCM, and the secondary aquifers carry 
162.5 BCM (MAW, 1984). 
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Table  2-2 Primary Aquifer of Non-renewable Groundwater in Saudi Arabia. 
A: Proven, B: Probable, C: Possible. 
Aquifer Thickness (m) 
Total        
Dissolved 
solids (mg/l) 
ECe 
(mS/cm) 
Depth from 
ground 
surface (m) 
Reserve (BCM) 
Regions 
A B C 
Saq 500–600 500-1,500 0.781-2.34 100-1,500 65 100 200 
Tabuk, 
Hail, 
Qaseem 
Wajid 300–400 500-1,000 0.781-1.56 15-1,100 30 50 100 Riyadh 
Tabuk 1000 500-3,500 0.781-5.47 10-1,400 5.6 5.6 5.6 
Tabuk,Jouf 
Hail, 
Qaseem 
Minjur/ 
Dhurma 
Minjur: 
360 
Dhurma: 
100–110 
Minjur:   
400-1,600 
Minjur: 
0.625-2.5 
Minjur: 
1,400 17.5 35 85 
Riyadh 
Wasia-
Biyadh 
Biyadh: 
100–400 
Wasia: 
200-230 
Wasia: 
1,000-3,000 
Wasia: 
1.56-4.69 
Wasia:   
230-1,200 120 180 290 Riyadh 
Umm er 
Radhuma 500 
300-1,000 0.460-1.56 250-600 16 40 75 
Eastern 
Province 
Dammam-
Neogene 
Dammam: 
200 
Neogene: 
30–100 
Dammam: 
1,000-6,000 
Neogene: 
100-4,000 
Dammam: 
1.56-9.38 
Neogene: 
0.165-6.25 
Dammam: 
100-500 
Neogene: 
10-150 
5 5 5 
Eastern 
Province 
Reference: Chowdhury and Al-Zahrany (2012). 
Furthermore, sources of water consumed for domestic purposes and industry can 
be divided into conventional resources, such as groundwater and dams, and non-
conventional resource, such as desalination of sea water. Conventional resources 
represented 41 percent of the domestic water demand, while the non-conventional 
resource described by 59 percent in 2014 (MOWE, 2014). The Saudi government has 
invested considerable money through the Saline Water Conversion Corporation (SWCC) 
since the 1970s and built 28 plants throughout this period. Thus, SWCC is the main non-
conventional resource in Saudi Arabia and produced 1,695 MCM in 2014. 
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2.4. Water Use in Saudi Arabia 
 As a result of the Saudi government’s policies to increase food production and 
increase the standard of living, demand for water is growing. The total demand for water 
in 2015 was 24,844 MCM. The main consumer is the agricultural sector, which consumes 
84 percent of the total demand for water while the residential sector consumes 12 percent. 
The industrial sector uses only 4 percent of the water demand. Figure 4.4 shows the 
demand for all the sectors on water since 1970 to 2015 and shows the demand for water 
fluctuating in response to variations in government goals and policies. However, the 
agricultural sector is the largest user even the government adopted many of policies to 
reduce the water demand for the agricultural sector. 
 From the 1980s through 1990s, the Saudi government sought to fulfill its goal of 
achieving self-sufficiency in an area with limited arable land and fresh water. The desire 
for self-sufficiency encouraged the government to adopt policies that: caused a change in 
crop patterns, increased the total cropland, and increased irrigation water demand. For 
instance, between 1970 and 1995, the agricultural sector's demand for water increased 
from 6,108 MCM to 21,298 MCM. During that time, the Saudi government provided 
different types of subsidies to encourage farmers to expand to growing wheat and other 
crops. 
As a result of the subsidy programs intended to develop the agricultural sector, 
Saudi Arabia achieved self-sufficiency in wheat production in 1980, when it produced 
around 1.4 million tons of wheat. In 1985, the Saudi government started to export wheat; 
in 1989, Saudi Arabia exported more than 1.6 million tons of wheat. The development of 
the agricultural sector moved Saudi Arabia closer to its food independence. In this way, 
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self-sufficiency helped Saudi Arabia reach several broad objectives, including food 
security, the diversification of the economy, and the improvement of rural welfare. 
 After 1995, the government tried to balance the conflicting goals self-sufficiency 
and reducing the agricultural sector’s demand for water by reducing the support price for 
wheat and imposing a production quota for each farmer to reduce the production of 
wheat.  
 In 2007, new Saudi government new policies targeted wheat production  with an 
objective of reducing the production of wheat by 12.5 percent annually and stopping 
dependence on domestic wheat supply and instead depending on the world market 
(World-Grain.com, 2016). While these policies led to a change in the crop pattern in 
Saudi Arabia and decreased the water demand for the agricultural sector from 2008 until 
2010, since 2011, the demand for agricultural sector has increased as a result of the 
change in crop pattern that refected another revision to governmetn policies that 
encouraged fodder produciton. The agricultural water demand increased from 15,979 
MCM in 2011 to 20,831 MCM in 2015 (MOWE, 2015). While the new policy caused a 
change in the crop pattern, it resulted in increased demand for irrigation water. 
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Figure  2-4 Growth in consumption of water (MCM) in Saudi Arabia between 1970 and 
2015 
Source: Abderrahman (2005), Ministry of water and electricity (2014 and 2015) 
Also, the demand for domestic water in Saudi Arabia has increased as a result of a 
growing population and a rising tstandard of living. For instance, in 2014, the domestic 
water demand increased by about 43 percent compared with 2007. In 2008, the domestic 
water demand was estimated at 2,007 MCM, and it rose to 3,025 MCM in 2015 (MOWE, 
2015). Also, the average per capita, per day consumption in Saudi Arabia is 263 liters of 
fresh water. However, the average consumption per capita per day increased by around 
14 percent compared to 2007. So, a growing population and standard of living increased 
pressure on the domestic water source. Also, there is an essential factor causing an 
increase in demand for domestic water. Saudi government provides desalinated water 
with a large price subsidy, while for the other households that use groundwater the 
government provides the water at no cost. Also, the industrial sector’s demand for water 
is growth since 1970 where the demand was 20 MCM and becomes 977 MCM in 2015. 
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Even there is a significant growth rate, the industrial sector’s demand represents the 
lowest user in Saudi Arabi while the agricultural sector is the largest water user. 
Therefore, the Saudi government focus to reduce the agricultural sector’s demand for 
water to reduce the total demand for water. 
2.5. Agricultural Development 
 Diversification of the economy was one of the most important goals for the first 
Saudi Five-Year Plan in 1970. Increasing agricultural self-sufficiency was a tool to help 
diversify the economy. In 1974, the agricultural sector contributed 1.8 percent to the 
GDP. When the government supported the sector, the domestic agricultural product’s 
GDP contribution increased to 4.4 percent in 1985. In 1989, the GDP proportion of the 
domestic agricultural product rose further to 6.4 percent. During the period between 1999 
and 2002, the agricultural sector’s contribution to the GDP ranged between 5.11 and 5.8 
percent (MOA, 2005). However, when the Saudi government changed its agricultural 
policies by reducing support to the agricultural sector in 2004, the share of the domestic 
agricultural product decreased, only contributing 1.9 percent to the GDP in 2013 (MOA, 
2014). Therefore, the contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP appears to be 
dependent on the level of government support. 
Self-sufficiency is also driven by the desire of the government to increase rural 
welfare. Unfortunately, there is no indicator of whether the countryside’s welfare 
improved as a result of the supported agricultural programs. Modern farms can obtain 
many subsidies that lead to a reduction in the average cost of the output and an increase 
in the marginal profit per unit. In contrast, traditional farmers find it difficult to compete 
with modern farmers; this could cause the conventional farmers to exit the market. Self-
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sufficiency may help to achieve food security, but the cost to the government and society 
are reductions in several natural resources and the use of a great deal of capital. So, self-
sufficiency does not lead to sustainable diversification of the economy or improvement in 
rural welfare, and food security remains an area of high concern for the Saudi 
government. 
Since 1959, Saudi Arabia has been dealing with the issue of food security as a 
result of its policy regarding subsidizing imported food. This policy aimed to ensure that 
food would be available and accessible to the Saudi nation (Nowshirvani, 1987). 
However, in October 1973, the Ramadan or Yom Kippur War occurred between Egypt 
and Syria on one side and Israel on the other. The United States supported Israel against 
Egypt and Syria. Therefore, the Arab members of OPEC led by Saudi Arabia used oil as 
a political weapon against the United States to encourage if to stop supporting Israel in 
that War. In response, the United States threatened Arab countries with the use of food as 
a political weapon against oil. Therefore, food security achieved by self-sufficiency has 
been an issue of great concern for the Saudi government, and it has become one of the 
primary objectives of the Five-Year Plans1. The subject of food security was evident in 
the speech of the Minister of Agriculture and Water, Dr. Abdul Rahman Al-Sheikh, who 
said, “To produce your food on your land, it’s a matter of security” (New York Times, 
1985). Consequently, the Saudi government decided to facilitate its food security through 
self-sufficiency by establishing programs to support the country’s agricultural sector. 
                                                 
 
1 Since 1971, Saudi government established a five-year plan to develop the Saudi economic. 
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 Self-sufficiency regarding food has led the Saudi government to use several 
different natural resources, such as oil, land, and water. The government invested the 
revenue from oil in developing agriculture and applied various policies to extend the 
agricultural sector vertically, thus increasing productivity, and horizontally to increase the 
land used in farming. Therefore, the Saudi government adopted a different program and 
policy with the goal of reaching self-sufficiency based on its limited natural resources 
and high import of technology. The Saudi government also established several 
governmental institutions that contributed to the implementation of public policy and the 
development of local agriculture: 
1) The Ministry of Agriculture and Water (MAW), which currently called the 
Ministry of Environment and Water and Agriculture (MEWA);  
2) Agricultural Bank, which currently called the Agricultural Development Fund 
(ADF); 
3) The Grain Silos and Flour Mills Organization, which currently called the Saudi 
Grains Organization (SAGO). Each of these institutions has contributed to the 
country’s agricultural development and helped further progress toward food 
security. 
2.6. Agricultural Policies 
The agricultural sector has received increasing attention due to its role in helping 
the Saudi government achieve its economic development objectives. The objectives 
include: achieving self-sufficiency regarding food, increasing the incomes of the rural 
members of the nation, diversifying the production base, reducing the volume of imports, 
reducing the demand for irrigation water, and reducing the country’s dependence on oil 
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as the primary source of national income. Hence, the Saudi government adopted different 
programs and policies to support and encourage the private sector to invest in the 
agricultural sector. These programs and policies were designed to provide help to farmers 
both directly and indirectly. The next section presents many of the agricultural policies 
that the Saudi government adopted to develop the agricultural sector from 1970 to 2014. 
 Distribution of farmland free of charge 2.6.1.
Agricultural land distribution is one of the policies designed to support farmers 
with the goal of increasing agricultural production. Distribution of fallow farmland 
represents one of the most important contributing factors to increases in the total 
agricultural land in Saudi Arabia as shown in Table 2.3. This policy helps to increase the 
area of farmland in production; the total cumulative distribution of farmland that is used 
for plant production and animal production is 3.3 million hectares within the period of 
1969 to 2003. In 1984, the government reevaluated the distribution of the farmland 
fallow system and decided to continue distributing the farmland within areas with 
renewable water resources, such as southwest regions where the rainfall rate is relatively 
high. In 2003, the government decided to stop the distribution of the farmland fallow 
system to stop the exhaustion of groundwater, which represents the most significant 
source of irrigation water. However, the total cumulative distribution in 1981 was more 
than a hundred thousand hectors while the agricultural land was more than four hundred 
thousand hectors as shown in Table 2.3. Thus, as a result of increasing the distribution 
farmland, the farm area rose to 1.7 million hectors in 1991 and decreased to 1.2 million 
hectares in 2001. So, the effect of the distribution of land on agricultural area become 
observe since the 1980s. 
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Table  2-3  The cumulative distribution of Agricultural land distribution 
Year The total cumulative distribution of agricultural land, Unit (Hactar) 
Agricultural land 
Unit (Hactar) 
1981 185,912 434,829 
1982 372,386 596,936 
1983 487,522 731,269 
1984 578,932 782,695 
1985 749,052 946,360 
1986 841,421 947,381 
1987 1,037,244 1,061,773 
1988 1,288,590 1,245,063 
1989 1,498,120 1,326,156 
1990 1,632,516 1,379,189 
1991 1,754,515 1,519,758 
1992 2,027,693 1,570,818 
1993 2,368,624 1,596,405 
1994 2,585,091 1,595,549 
1995 2,726,207 1,302,361 
1996 2,820,558 1,173,311 
1997 2,901,522 1,263,263 
1998 2,947,510 1,130,493 
1999 2,985,760 1,226,507 
2000 3,048,108 1,119,949 
2001 3,091,639 1,211,579 
2002 3,204,338 1,224,502 
2003 3,259,844 1,216,038 
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 35BAgricultural lending policy 2.6.2.
The Agricultural Development Fund (ADF), which was established in 1964 and 
began practice in 1966, is a significant factor in improving the agricultural sector. It is a 
government credit institution specializing in financing various aspects of agricultural 
activity in all regions of Saudi Arabia. The goal of the ADF is to support farmers by 
funding them with interest-free loans and supporting them through subsidies. The ADF 
finances small farmers from SAR 200 thousand to SAR three million. Also, the ADF 
finances specialized agricultural projects starting at three million and extending to SAR 
20 million. Also, ADF provides an extended grace period from one to six years, 
depending on the nature of the project. 
 36BPolicies that support purchased inputs 2.6.3.
 The Saudi government focused on supporting farmers through a program that 
encourages farmers to increase agricultural production through programs that reduce the 
cost of production. For example, in 1973, the Ministry of Environment and Water and 
Agriculture (MEWA) established a chemical fertilizer subsidy by providing the farmer 50 
percent of the fertilizer cost. However, this support ended in 1982. Also, the ADF 
provided input subsidies such as  
(1) paying half of the official price of the irrigation pumps and equipment,  
(2) 45 percent for farm machinery, 
(3) 30 percent for poultry and dairy equipment if ADF did not finance the project 
while the subsidy was 20 percent if the project was financed by ADF( Al-Zahrani, 
2003).  
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 In 2004, the ADF was reformed direct subsidies that was provided to farmers such 
as input subsidies by reducing 25 percent of the total loan value if the lender did not 
delay the monthly payments. Also, the ADF increased the subsidy of the irrigation 
system to 75 percent of its cost. 
 Payment of production subsidies 2.6.4.
 The objective of price supports is to increase the production of specific products, 
such as wheat, barley, dates, sorghum, millet, and rice. Under this aim, two types of 
policies exist, either to directly support the price or to provide a subsidy on the quantity 
of production. The subsidy on the amount of output covers baby palm trees, dates, 
sorghum, millet, and rice. The MEWA paid SAR 50 for each baby palm tree and SAR 
0.25 per kilogram of dates based on production. This kind of support encouraged farmers 
to increase the quality and quantity of date palms. Also, farmers who grow sorghum, 
millet, and rice were offered a direct payment under which the farmers receive SAR 0.25, 
0.15, and 0.30 per kilogram, of production respectively (Alghamdi,2000). In October 
2011, the government restructured the support program as follows: it stopped subsidies to 
grow baby palm trees and rice, continued to subsidize sorghum and millet with SAR 0.25 
per kilogram, continued to subsidize small farmers with SAR 0.50 per kilogram but only 
if the farmer uses a modern irrigation system, and stopped subsidizing other forms of 
irrigated production. 
 Support for the price of wheat and barley came through the Saudi Grains 
Organization (SAGO), which represents the primary demand source for wheat in Saudi 
Arabia. The government offered assistance for growing wheat by direct payment since 
1977 and then transferred to a price support program, thus encouraging the private sector 
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to enter agriculture and invest in wheat projects. The support price started from SAR 
3,500 (933.33 USD) per ton in 1980. In 1984, the government reduced the support price 
for wheat to SAR 2000 (533USD) for individuals and SAR 1500 (400 USD) for 
agricultural companies. The government then further reduced the support price, but the 
production of wheat increased to more than four million tons in 1994. In response, the 
government established a quota program to reduce the production of wheat. In 2004, the 
government cut the support price to SAR 1000 (266.66 US) per ton. 
 Additionally, the SAGO decreased its wheat purchases annually by 12.5 percent 
in 2008 and imported wheat to bridge the domestic consumption gap; 2016 was the last 
year of supported wheat production in Saudi Arabia. The other product with supported 
price is barley. This program started in 1986, at which time the price was SAR 1000 
(266.66 USD), and the program ended in 1998. Furthermore, the government purchases 
21 thousand tons of dates annually under the support price, which is SAR 3.5 (0.93 USD) 
per kilogram and increases the price to SAR 5 (1.33 USD) per kg if the farmer uses drip 
irrigation system. 
 Table 2.4 summarizes all of these programming subsidies to show the established 
date and the timeline of the change in the policy. All of these policies helped Saudi 
Arabia become more self-sufficient in its various products, especially dates, eggs, milk, 
fresh vegetables, fruit, chicken, and red meat, but self-sufficiency regarding wheat has 
not existed since 2008. Therefore, from 1974 until 2013 the MEWA paid more than SAR 
4.62 billion to farmers as production subsidies that encouraged them to produce more 
                                                 
 
2 Calculate by author from different sources 
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food. On the other hand, ADF provided more than 13.23 billion SR to farmers from 1973 
until 2013 as input subsidies while ADF lent the farmers, with zero interest, more than 
45.24 billion SR from 1964 until 2013. All these subsidies aim to increase food 
production to achieve food security, motivate farmers to adopt modern technology to 
reduce the demand for irrigation and increase farmers’ income. However, the subsidies 
lead to inefficiency because when the government achieves an objective, it lose the other 
objectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
3 Calculate by author from different sources 
4 Calculate by author from different sources 
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Table  2-4 History of Agricultural Policies in Saudi Arabia 
Policies 
Started 
of 
policy 
Value Change  End of policy 
Agricultural lending 1965 50%-100% 2004 Reform the lend policy. Continues 
Subsidies of production elements 
Chemical fertilizers 1973 50% 1982 Stop the subsidy 1982 
Agricultural machinery 1973 45% 2004 The government reforms the 
subsidies by stopping the 
subsites of the production 
factors and subsidies the lender 
by 25% if the lender will not 
delay the monthly payment. 
Also, the government increased 
the subsidy of the irrigation 
system to 75%. 
2004 
Intensive fodder 1973 50% 2004 2004 
Pumps and agricultural 
engines 1973 50% 2004 2004 
Equipment for the production 
of Dairy 1974 30% 2004 2004 
Transfer of cattle by air 1974 100% 2004 2004 
Poultry equipment 1973 30% 2004 2004 
Fishing boats 1976 Depend 2004 2004 
Subsidies of production 
Wheat 1973 0.25 SR/Kg 
 Stop the subsidy of wheat per Kg  1978 
1978 Establish support price by 2 SR/Kg  
1979-
1984 
Increasing  support price to 3.5 
SR/Ks  
1985-
1994 
Reducing support price to 2 
SR/kg for farmers and 1.5 for 
agricultural companies. 
 
1995-
2004 
Reducing support price to 1.5 
SR/kg and establish the quota 
program. 
 
2005 Reducing support price to 1 SR/kg  
   2007 Reducing purchasing by 12% and stop at 2016 2016 
Rice 1973 0.30 SR/Kg 2011 Stop the subsidy 2011 
Sorghum 1973 0.25 SR/Kg 
No 
change   
Millet 1975 0.15 SR/Kg 
No 
change   
Barley 
1975 0.15 SR/Kg 1986 
Purchasing Barley from a local 
farm by 1 SR/Kg  
  2003 Stop support growing Barley locally 2003 
Dates 1976 0.25 SR/Kg 2011 
Increasing subsidy to 0.50 
SR/Kg for small farmers if the 
farmers adopted a modern 
irrigation system 
 
Baby Palm tree 1976 
50 
SR/baby 
tree 
2011 Stop the subsidy 2011 
Barren land distribution 
1969 
Free 
- Start to distribute barren land freely.  
 1984 
Stop Distributing agricultural 
land in into regions that have 
non-renewable water resources. 
2003 
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 MODEL DESIGN, LOGIC AND STRUCTURE CHAPTER 3.
3.1. Introduction 
 Chapter 3 covers the methodology used to address the problem of the dissertation. 
The chapter introduces two types of models. The first is a regional linear programming 
model that optimizes the profit from crop production for each study region, subject to a 
number of constraints. The main categories of constraint are:  the availability of cropland, 
the availability of irrigation water and an aggregation constraint that limits the magnitude 
of shifts in production from historic levels. In this section, the methodology developed to 
estimate the gross irrigation water requirement for each crop is set out.  
The second model is a national model that is structured as a bi-level, multi-
follower programming model. In the national model the national government has two 
objectives, to minimize the total irrigation water used and to maximize a target level of 
the total gross revenue from agricultural production. The dissertation uses total revenue 
as a proxy for food security. Farmers, defined as a single large farm in each of six distinct 
regions, in turn incorporate constraints on water use set by the national government into 
their profit maximizing decision using the regional model.   
Because the national model uses an approach that is both complex and relatively 
novel, the theoretical  basis of a bi-level optimization process is discussed and developed 
into the bi-level, multi-objective, multi-follower optimization approach. Subsequently, a 
procedure to solve the bi-level, multi-objective, multi-follower optimization is provided. 
The resulting empirical model and its assumptions are then provided. The last section of 
the chapter introduces two algorithms that are used to solve the national model. The first 
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algorithm is Reallocated Irrigation Water Policy (RIWP) while the second algorithm is 
Integrated Irrigation Water Management Policy (IIWMP). 
3.2. Methodology 
 The Saudi government essentially faces a Principal-Agent (PA) problem in trying 
to reduce water consumption while maintaining food security. The PA problem occurs 
because, while the governmetn has objectives for irrigation water use and food security, it 
depends on the actions of farmers to determine whether its objectives are met. And, 
importantly, farmers do not share the governmetn’s objectives, but instead act to 
maximiaze their individual profits. For example, suppose the government wants to 
preserve food security by producing 1.03 million tons of wheat, and 2.2 million tons of 
vegetables while reducing water use by agriculture. The government might assume there 
is a social contract with the farmers who use the irrigation water to irrigate their farms to 
achieve these objectives, but in reality they have different objectives. The farmers use 
irrigation water use and choose crops to grow to maximize their profit. Therefore, the 
farmers may grow fodder and use more water than the governmetn suggets to maximize 
their profit. 
 Although the government can restrict water consumption by agriculture, it cannot 
assure an adequate amount of food is produced without the cooperation of farmers. Thus, 
the policy problem for the government is to find a way to align farmers’ incentives with 
its objectives. One way to motivate the farmers to act in ways that achieve the 
government’s objectives through crop specific subsidies or taxation that alter profits. 
Since conditions vary by region, the government has to adopt region specific policies. 
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The bi-level, multi-objective, multi-follower optimization method can provide a means 
for government to idenitify these region specific policies.  
3.3. Regional Farm Models 
 The six regional models all have the same structure, with each region having its 
own parameters. Historic average crop patterns in the six regions are shown in Figure 3.1 
for the four main groups of, grain, vegetable, fodder, and fruits. The crop area for each 
crop group is the average crop area of the five years (2009-2013) For instance, the crop 
pattern in Riyadh is presented as the following; the grain group represents 14.2 percent; 
vegetable group represents 23.2 percent, fodder group represents 40.2 percent, and fruits 
group represents 22.5 percent. Also, the main irrigation water resource in these regions is 
groundwater, with the availability and quality of water varying among regions. The 
quality of irrigation groundwater is not homogeneous within, or across regions even if the 
regions share an aquifer. For instance, Riyadh has several aquifers, and the quality of 
these aquifers range between not saline to high saline while the Juof region has a single 
aquafer.  Falatah et al. (1999) find the average water salinity in Riyadh is 3.65 dS m-1. 
Table 3.1 illustrates the average irrigation water quality for each region. Thus, the quality 
of the irrigation water varies among regions, which affects the gross irrigation water 
requirement for each crop. 
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Figure  3-1 Describe crop pattern based on plant groups. 
 
Table  3-1 Data Summary of the Irrigation Water Quality 
Region 
ECw 
Min Max Average S.D 
Riyadha 0.2 11.9 3.65 2.67 
Qaseema 0.7 4.3 2.91 1.48 
Eastena 
(AlHasa) 2.9 3.6 3.05 0.34 
Tabuka 0.2 2.7 0.71 0.37 
Hailb 166.4=0.26 2400=3.75 557=0.871 0.24 
Joufa 0.8 3.6 2.15 1.05 
a: Falatah et al. (1999). Chemical Composition of Irrigation Groundwater Used in Some Agricultural 
Regions of Saudi Arabia. 
b: Al-Turki (2009). Evaluation of well-water quality in the Hael (Hail) region of Central Saudi Arabia. 
 
  Each region produces between 21 to 22 crops, as shown in table 3.5, which 
provide information about the five year average  crop area and yield. Yield varies among 
the regions for several reasons, such as the quality of water irrigation. To keep the yield 
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at its maximum, the irrigation water requirement has to be enough to remove the salinity 
of the root zone, as well as satisfying the plants direct water needs. Furthermore, the 
quantity of irrigation water required increases as the degree of salinity increases, because 
the leaching requirement also increases. 
3.4. Estimating Gross Irrigation Water Requirements 
 A number of concepts are used to estimate the gross irrigation water requirement. 
The first is the crop water requirement, which means the quantity of water required to 
actually grow the crop. The second concept is a leaching requirement. When irrigation 
water carries some salts, they accumulate in the soil over time To flush these salts below 
the root zone  requires adding some fraction of the crop water requirement to keep the 
root zone free of salinity that would oherwise reduce crop yield. Both elements are used 
to calculate the total amount of required irrigation water, which is called the gross water 
requirement. 
 To elaborate, according to Savva and Frenken (2002), the irrigation water 
requirement is the amount of water which must be provided by the irrigation system to 
ensure that the crop obtains its full crop water. Several factors affect the irrigation water 
requirement, such as crop evapotranspiration, available rainfall, and leaching 
requirements. The primary component for estimating irrigation water requirement is 
evapotranspiration (ET). Evapotranspiration consists of two operations, evaporation and 
transpiration. Evaporation refers to lost water from the soil surface, while transpiration 
refers to the transfer of the water from plant tissues to the atmosphere. These operations 
occur simultaneously, and there is no easy way to distinguish between the two processes. 
The evapotranspiration concept consists of two elements: reference evapotranspiration 
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𝐸𝑇0 and crop evapotransporation 𝐸𝑇𝑐. 𝐸𝑇0 represents the evaporative demand of the 
atmosphere at a particular location and time of the year, and the main factors that affect 
𝐸𝑇0 are climatic parameters. There are many different methods to estimate 𝐸𝑇0, and the 
FAO Penman-Monthith method is the sole recommended method. 𝐸𝑇c refers to the 
amount of water that a crop needs, which it is affected by climatic paramenters and crop 
characteristics. In some sense, crop water requirement (CWR) is equal to 𝐸𝑇c, but the 
CWR refers to the quantity supply required to grow the crops (Savva and Frenken, 2002). 
The following equation shows how to calucalte the 𝐸𝑇c. 
𝐸𝑇c = 𝑘𝑐 × 𝐸𝑇𝑜         (3.1) 
 However, to estimate 𝐸𝑇c, which is measured by (mm/day), requires knowing the 
reference crop value 𝐸𝑇0, which is measured by (mm/day), and the value of crop 
coefficients 𝑘c, which reflect the characteristic of a specific crop. Similarly, 
environmental conditions within a greenhouse differ from the those in an open field. 
Specifically, the value of reference evapotranspiration 𝐸𝑇0 and crop evapotransporation 
𝐸𝑇𝑐 in the greenhouse is lower than in an open field, as Fernandes et al. (2003) found.  
Fernandes et al. (2003) found the 𝐸𝑇0 inside the greenhouse is lower than outside the 
greenhouse by (56%, 63, and 69%), depending on the method used to measure the crop 
reference inside the greenhouse. So,  the value of 𝐸𝑇0 in the greenhouse is reduced by 60 
to 70 percent compared to outside the greenhouse. Also, Mpusia (2006) estimated the 
actual evapotranspiration 𝐸𝑇c for roses and found the actual evapotranspiration 𝐸𝑇c in the 
greenhouse was 65% of actual evapotranspiration 𝐸𝑇c open field. Also, Singh et al (2016) 
found there was no large difference between the value of reference evapotranspiration 
𝐸𝑇0 in the greenhouse and open field, but instead the difference was that reference 
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evapotranspiration 𝐸𝑇0 in open field is higher than in greenhouse by 15.88 percent in 
total. Also, Singh et al. (2016) found the difference in crop coefficients was just 4.61 
percent higher in the open field than in a greenhouse, while the actual evapotranspiration 
𝐸𝑇c in open field is higher than in a greenhouse by 21.58 percent. 
 Data for crop water requirements (CWR) usually is available in published papers 
or an official report. Different sources, such as Alamoudi et al. (2010), which is a report 
that provides the CWR for many crops for different regions were used where available, 
while estimates for some crop CWRs were estimated using the FAO method. Also, the 
CWR for trees was obtained from an older study completed by the Saudi Agricultural 
Ministry (1980). However, since there is no study comparing CWR inside the greenhouse 
and outside (open field), the analysis assumes the actual evapotranspiration 𝐸𝑇c for the 
greenhouse is lower than for an open field by 40 percent. Also, the study follows the 
method developed by Al-Ghobari et al. (2003) to transfer data for CWRs from the 
reference region to the target region by using equation (3.2): 
(𝐸𝑇𝑐)𝑥 = (𝐸𝑇𝑐)𝑅 �(𝐸𝑃)𝑥(𝐸𝑃)𝑅�2        (3.2) 
 Equation (3.2) shows how to convert crop water requirement data from a 
reference region, R, to the target region, which is x using historical climate data. The 
equation uses three variables that must be available: the CWR in the reference 
region (𝐸𝑇𝑐)𝑅, pan evaporation in the targeted area (𝐸𝑃)𝑥, and pan evaporation in the 
reference region (𝐸𝑃)𝑅 . Pan evaporation rates, (𝐸𝑃)𝑥 and (𝐸𝑃)𝑥 were obtained from Al-
Ghobari et al. (2003) and Alamoud et al. (2010). 
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 In Saudi Arabia, many studies have used alfalfa as a crop reference. These studies 
used the Lysimetric method to estimate crop reference (Al-Ghobari, 2000; Al-Ghobari et 
al., 2003; Alamoud et al., 2010). The dissertation uses the crop reference data from 
Alamoud et al. (2010) since Alamoud et al. (2010) covered nine regions. Unfortunately, 
there are two regions included in the dissertation that are not covered: Hial and Tabuk. 
Based on the author’s knowledge, no study that estimate the crop reference covers Hail 
and Tabuk. The study adopts Al-Ghobari et al. (2003) method to transpose the reference 
crop in the Riyadh region to another region. Al-Ghobari et al. (2003) used Equation (3.2) 
to calculate the synthetic data. The data of (𝐸𝑃)𝑥 and (𝐸𝑃)𝑥 were obtained from Al-
Ghobari et al. (2003) and Alamoud et al. (2010). The results of the synthetic data 
illustrates that the data follows the pattern of the data calculated by Alamoud et al. 
(2010). Table 3.2 shows the value of the reference crop for each region. 
Table  3-2 Daily evapotranspiration ET0 average (mm/day) 
 Riyadh1 Qaseem1 Eastern1 Hail2 Tabuk2 Jouf1 
January 3.6 3.2 3.6 2.94 3.29 2.9 
February 4.7 4.3 4.8 3.42 4.06 4.1 
March 6.2 5.8 6.5 4.92 5.39 5.8 
April 7.9 7.7 8.2 7.00 7.06 8.0 
May 9.4 9.5 10.9 8.98 8.43 9.8 
June 10.7 10.2 12.7 11.33 9.40 10.8 
July 11.3 10.4 12.9 13.11 10.44 11.6 
August 10.1 9.5 11.3 12.18 10.25 10.4 
September 8.2 8.2 8.9 11.01 9.26 9.1 
October 6.2 6.5 6.6 8.64 7.17 6.7 
November 4.6 4.6 5.1 5.86 4.78 4.2 
December 3.5 3.3 3.5 4.01 3.87 3.1 
1: Reference data is from Alamoud et al. (2010). 
2: Data Transposing. 
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 Alamoud et al. (2010) estimated the crop water requirement for different crops in 
different regions. The dissertation uses these data to estimate total crop water 
requirement. Alamoud et al. (2010) did not estimate all of the crops that the present study 
covered in all regions. More specifically, Hail and Tabuk have not covered in Alamoud et 
al. (2010). Consequently, this dissertation follows Al-Ghobari et al. (2003) and their use 
of synthetic crop water requirement (CWR) data in Hail and Tabuk using Equation (3.2). 
 Also, some crops have no crop water requirement data, 𝐸𝑇𝑐 or crop coefficients. 
In these cases the procedure applied by Allen et al. (1998) is used to estimate the crop 
coefficient and then estimates of the crop water requirement are calculated. Table 3.3 
shows the data regarding the water requirement for all crops covered in the study in all 
regions. 
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Table  3-3 Crop Water Requirement (ETc)  m3 per hectare 
Crops Riyadh Qaseem Eastern Tabuk Hail Jouf 
Cereals Group 
Wheat 9,254.9b 5,156.0a 5,608.0a 5,016.2c 4,211.3c 5,071.0a 
Barley 6,516.0a 8,932.9c 7,311.3c 8,337.5c 6,889.4c 4,994.2c 
Sorghum 3,606.6c 3,747.0c 3,091.8c 4,609.6c 6,565.9c 1,874.3c 
Maize 5,956.0a 6,234.9c 5,129.6c 6,363.9c 9,025.6c 7,050.0a 
Millet 2,439.5c 2,390.1c 2,102.6c 3,298.1c 4,045.6c 784.2c 
Sesame 3,261.6c 3,163.3c 2,787.9c 4,279.8c 5,191.6c 1,131.1c 
Other Cereal 4,295.6e 3,597.4e 4,338.6e 5,317.5e 5,988.2e 3,260.5e 
Vegetables Group 
Tomato (OF) 5,980.0a 5,806.0a 4,810.0a 4,785.1c 4,485.9c 4,143.1c 
Tomato (GH) 3,588.0f 3,483.6f 2,886.0f 2,871.0f 2,691.6f 2,485.9f 
Eggplant 5,033.9d 5,347.3d 5,000.5d 5,135.3d 5,116.1d 5,975.0d 
Squash (OF) 4,387.5b 4,280.0a 3,486.1c 4,966.7c 7,228.5c 2,772.7c 
Squash (GH) 2,632.5f 2,568.0f 2,091.6f 2,980.0f 4,337.1f 1,663.6f 
Cucumber (OF) 10,046.9d 11,246.1d 12,291.9d 10,346.7d 12,074.9d 13,045.6d 
Cucumber (GH) 6,028.1f 6,747.7f 7,375.1f 6,208.0f 7,244.9f 7,827.4f 
Okra 7,894.3c 7,994.0a 7,142.68c 6,727.2c 9,373.6c 7,635.4c 
Carrots 3,711.3d 3,451.5d 3,923.9d 3,913.0d 4,120.2d 3,885.8d 
Potato 3,916.0a 4,996.0a 4,159.0a 5,975.7c 8,494.2c 6,908.0a 
Dray onion 4,485.0c 5,089.3c 4,188.6c 5,641.8c 4,899.8c 2,289.9c 
Melon 5,848.0a 7,926.3c 6,796.3c 6,114.7c 6,434.5c 6,182.6c 
Watermelon 5,848.0a 7,926.3c 6,796.3c 6,114.7c 6,434.5c 6,182.6c 
other Vegetable (OF) 5,601.8e 6,406.3e 5,859.5e 5,972.1e 6,866.2e 5,902.1e 
Other Vegetable (GH) 3,361.1f 3,843.8f 3,515.7f 3,583.3f 4,119.7f 3,541.3f 
Fodder Group 
Alfalfa 26,329.0a 25,356.0a 28,957.0a 25,585.7c 28,499.2c 26,377.0a 
Other fodder 15,653.1c 17,049.1c 14,600.9c 16,199.1c 20,422.3c 13,075.5c 
Fruits Group 
Dates plum 16,811.0g 17,017.0g 17,026.0g 15,741.0g 17,257.0g 17,235.0g 
Citrus 18,016.0g 18,640.0g 18,152.0g 16,802.0g 18,324.0g 18,324.0g 
Grapes 12,451.0g 12,393.0g 13,125.0g 12,288.0g 14,158.0g 13,583.0g 
Other Fruit 15,759.3e 16,016.7e 16,101.0e 14,943.7e 16,579.7e 16,380.7e 
a: the source of ETc is Alamoudi et al. (2010), b: the source of ETc is Al-Gobari et al. (2003),  
c: used transfer data model by the author.          d: estimated by FAO method by author 
e: Average of ETc of the group                          f: reduced ETc on the open field by 40% 
g: Ministry of agricultural and water (1988) 
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 Recall that one of the most critical factors to estimate the net irrigation 
requirement is the leaching requirement. The purpose of the leaching requirement is to 
keep the root zone free of  salinity problems. Estimating the leaching fraction (LR) 
requires two equations: equation (3.3) estimates LR with surface irrigation, while 
equation (3.4) estimates LR with drip irrigation and sprinkler. 
𝐿𝑅 = 𝐸𝐶𝑤
5𝐸𝐶𝑒−𝐸𝐶𝑤
× 1
𝐿𝑒
         (3.3) 
𝐿𝑅 = 𝐸𝐶𝑤
2 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐸𝐶𝑒 × 1𝐿𝑒         (3.4) 
where 𝐿𝑅 is the minimum water requirement to leach the soil of salts. 𝐸𝐶𝑒represents the 
electrical conductivity of the soil saturation extract for a given crop appropriate to the 
tolerable degree of yield reduction (dS/m), 𝐸𝐶𝑒 is the electrical conductivity of the soil 
saturation extract for a given crop (dS/m), 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝐶𝑒 is the maximum tolerable electrical 
conductivity of the soil saturation extract for a given crop (dS/m), and 𝐿𝑒 is leaching 
efficiency (Al Omran, 2008). However, appliying these equations for low quality 
irrigation water leads to unusually high LRs in some regions, such as for okra and 
cucumber in Eastern Province was 0.62 and .36, while the LR for carrots was more than 
1. Thus, a standard leaching fraction of 15 percent was adopted for all regions, based on 
Paranchianakis and Chartzoulakis (2005) in which they said the common leaching 
fraction recomanded is between 15 and 20 percent. 
 Then, the net irrigation requirement and gross irrigation requirement are estimated 
through equations (3.5) and (3.6). 
𝐼𝑅𝑛 = 𝐶𝑊𝑅1−𝐿𝑅           (3.5) 
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𝐼𝑅𝑔 = 𝐼𝑅𝑛𝐸   where E is the overall efficiency of the irrigation project.                  (3.6) 
 The overall efficiency of irrigation was also estimated for each region because 
there is no data available about the overall efficiency of irrigation in Saudi Arabia. For 
estimation purposes the efficiency of drip irrigation system is assumed to be 90 percent, 
the efficiency of sprinkler irrigation system is 75 percent, and the efficiency of surface 
irrigation system is 60 percent. Then, irrigation efficiency is estimated by the following 
steps and generalizing the result to all region.  
(1) Find the total cropland for the crop from Detailed Result of the Agriculture 
Census (2015) and the sub cropland for that crop based on the irrigation system. 
(2)  Calculate the proportion of the cropland base on each irrigation system and 
multiply it by the irrigation efficiency. 
(3) Sum the results above to represent the overall irrigation system for the crop. 
 Table 3.4 shows the gross irrigation requirement for the six regions. Equation 
(3.5) is used to calculate applied water, while equation (3.6) is used to calculate the gross 
irrigation requirement. 
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Table  3-4 Gross crop water requirements (m3 per hectare) 
Crops Riyadh Qaseem Eastern Tabuk Hail Jouf 
Cereals Group 
Wheat 14,517.5 8,087.8 8,796.9 6,688.2 6,606.0 6,761.3 
Barley 10,221.2 14,012.5 11,468.7 11,116.7 10,806.9 6,658.9 
Sorghum 5,657.4 5,877.7 4,849.9 6,146.1 10,299.5 2,499.1 
Maize 9,342.7 9,780.3 8,046.4 8,485.3 14,157.8 9,400.0 
Millet - - - - - - 
Sesame - - - - - - 
Other Cereal 7,628.2 6,388.4 7,704.4 8,026.5 10,633.9 4,921.5 
Vegetables Group 
Tomato (OF) 8,971.3 8,710.3 7,216.0 6,101.9 6,729.9 5,283.3 
Tomato (GH) 4,690.2 4,553.7 3,772.5 3,190.1 3,518.4 2,762.1 
Eggplant 7,823.4 8,310.3 7,771.3 6,783.8 7,951.1 7,893.0 
Squash (OF) 6,865.9 6,697.7 5,455.3 6,606.4 11,311.7 3,688.1 
Squash (GH) 3,441.2 3,356.9 2,734.2 3,311.1 5,669.4 1,848.5 
Cucumber (OF) 15,163.4 16,973.4 18,551.7 13,273.5 18,224.3 16,735.9 
Cucumber (GH) 7,879.9 8,820.5 9,640.7 6,897.8 9,470.6 8,697.1 
Okra 17,132.4 17,348.7 15,501.1 12,409.6 20,342.6 14,084.8 
Carrots 7,099.5 6,602.6 7,506.3 6,362.7 7,881.8 6,318.4 
Potato 6,065.1 7,737.8 6,441.5 7,866.9 13,155.8 9,094.3 
Dray onion 7,080.7 8,034.6 6,612.7 7,570.9 7,735.4 3,072.9 
Melon 9,229.9 12,510.1 10,726.7 8,203.3 10,155.7 8,294.4 
Watermelon 9,178.2 12,440.0 10,666.6 8,157.3 10,098.8 8,247.9 
other Vegetable (OF) 9,579.0 10,954.6 10,019.7 8,680.4 11,741.2 8,578.6 
Other Vegetable (GH) 4,393.6 5,024.5 4,595.7 3,981.4 5,385.3 3,934.7 
Fodder Group 
Alfalfa 41,300.4 39,774.1 45,422.7 34,114.3 44,704.6 35,169.3 
Other fodder 24,553.9 26,743.7 22,903.4 21,598.7 32,035.0 17,433.9 
Fruits Group 
Dates plum 29,611.7 29,974.5 29,990.4 23,567.9 30,397.3 25,804.8 
Citrus 31,461.0 32,550.7 31,698.5 24,939.9 31,998.9 27,199.1 
Grapes 21,743.0 21,641.7 22,920.0 18,239.6 24,723.9 20,161.8 
Other Fruit 27,520.2 27,969.6 28,116.9 22,181.5 28,952.8 24,314.5 
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3.5. Farm Revenue 
 The farm’s revenue function for each crop is represented by equation (3.7). In the 
equation, 𝑇𝑅𝑐𝑗𝑟 represents the total revenue per hectare of crop c using  j farm types 
(open field or green house), while r represents a region. 𝑃𝑐𝑟 is the price of output per ton, 
while 𝑌𝑐𝑗𝑟 represents the actual crop yield per hectare of crop c using  j farm type, for 
region r. 
𝑇𝑅𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑟 = 𝑃𝑐𝑟𝑌𝑐𝑗𝑟𝑋𝑐𝑗𝑟              (3.7) 
 Estimating the total revenue for each region requires the yield and price for each 
crop. The dissertation used the average crop area and yield for the last five years of 
available data, which started from 2009 to 2013 (M.O.A, 2014) to determine the planted 
area and yield for each crop. Also, the price of crops is one of the most critical 
parameters required in the dissertation. The source of this data is the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the FAO website. Precisely, the source of the price data for the cereals 
group and the fodder group was the FAO website, and these prices represent the average 
import value for six years between 2008 and 2013. The source of price data for the 
vegetables and the fruits group was the Ministry of Agriculture. These prices reflect the 
average wholesale price over six-years, between 2009 and 2014. Wholesale price are 
considered to be a proxy for the farm gate price. 
 The total production as measured in tons of any crop equals the yield (in tons per 
hectare) multiplied by the cropland (hectare). Then, the total revenue measured in Sadi 
arabian rials (SAR) equals the total production (ton) of the crop multiplied by the price of 
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the crop (SAR/Ton). Thus, table 3.6 shows the prices of the crops for all regions for all 
the crops and the total revenue for each region. 
3.6. Regional Model 
The model assumes the farmer aims to maximize t profit, for that, s/he asks how 
many hectare in region r using farm technology type j should be planted with crop c, 
which it is Xrjc. Also, the farmer faces a limited amount of cropland and irrigation water 
in region r. The next sections provide the model that answers the objective above. 
 Objective Function of the Model 3.6.1.
 The objective function describes the annual profit of the farm or region, which is 
maximized by selecting the optimal crop production pattern. Equation (3.8) shows the 
objective function where 𝑍𝑟 is the farmers’ profit in the region r. 𝑅𝑐𝑗𝑟 is the coefficient 
vector of net return  per hectare (without the presence of policy) and, the decision 
variable  𝑋𝑐𝑗𝑟 is the area of crop c under farm type j, and r represent a region. The second 
term of the objective function 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑟 represents the agricultural policy, where,  𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑟 could 
be a tax charged per ton of production, or it could be a per ton subsidy.  
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑍𝑟 = ∑ ∑ (𝑅𝑐𝑗𝑟 − 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑟)𝐶𝑐𝐽𝑗 𝑋𝑐𝑗𝑟           (3.8) 
 To measure the net return 𝑅𝑐𝑗𝑟 = 𝑃𝑐𝑟𝑌𝑐𝑗𝑟 − 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑟, which is equal to the total 
revenue minus the total cost. The total revenue equals the price of crop c in region r 
multiplied by the yield (ton per hectare), 𝑌𝑐𝑗𝑟 of crop c under farm type j in region r. The 
crop production cost per hectare is another crucial parameter the model requires. Most of 
the cost data comes from a study presented to the Riyadh Economic Forum in the fourth 
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session in December 2009. The title of the study is “water and food security and 
sustainable development.” One element the study provided was the average cost of 
producing per ton of crops, such as grain, feed, and fruit, while the average cost per tons 
for vegetables was differentiated between greenhouses and field production. 
 The average cost of production per ton and per hectare used in the analysis is 
shown in Table 3.6. The average cost per hectare is estimated by multiplying the yield 
(ton per hectare) by the cost per ton. However, there are some crops where the average 
cost of production was not available in the 2009 study, such as for open field and 
greenhouse production of other vegetables, other cereals, other fruits, and carrots. For 
these, the average production cost of the group was used. Also, the average cost of 
production of tomatoes in the Riyadh region under greenhouse seems to be overestimated 
when compared to another study. For instance, Al-Abdulkader estimated the enterprise 
budget of some greenhouse vegetable crops in Saudi Arabia, and he estimated the total 
cost of production of tomatoes to be SAR. 175,374.09 per ton. Then, by assuming the 
yield of tomatoes is 81.3 ton per hectare, the average cost of production is SAR. 2,157.12 
per ton. Also, Al-Kahtani and Ismaiel (1997) estimated the total, average and marginal 
cost function for tomatoes. They found, the average cost for a quantity of 81.3 tons is 
2,391.09. The cost estimate of both studies is close to each other. Given this, the 
dissertation adopts the Al-Kahtani and Ismaiel (1997) estimates. 
 Constraints 3.6.2.
 The model has three primary types of constraints: cropland constraints, water 
availability and an aggregate constraint. The model has two cropland constraints. The 
first is cropland availability that is shown in equation (3.9). This constraint limits 
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farmland availability, so that the sum of the area of the various enterprises 𝑋𝑐𝑗𝑟  selected 
by farmer cannot exceed the available cropland given by  𝐴𝑟. Cropland availablity is 
estimated by the average cropland available between 2009 and 2013 for each region. 
Equation (3.10) blocks changes in the area of perennial crops, which are Dates, Citrus, 
Grapes and Other Fruit because the study assumes that moving from perennial crops to 
non-perennial crops or moving from non-perennial crops to perennial crops requires a 
long time interval that is beyond the scope of the dissertation. 𝑋�𝑐𝑗𝑟 represents the amount 
of cropland of the perennial crops and it is determined by the average cropland for five 
years. 
∑ ∑ 𝑋𝑐𝑗𝑟
𝐶
𝑐 ≤ 𝐴𝑟
𝐽
𝑗            (3.9)  
𝑋𝑐𝑗𝑟 ≤ 𝑋�𝑐𝑗𝑟   (Constraint for perennial crops)     (3.10) 
 The water constraint is shown in equation (3.11), which represents the water 
availability in region r. 𝑊𝑐𝑗𝑟 is a parameter which represents the gross crop water 
requirement (GWR) for crop c under farm type  j while 𝑊0𝑟 represents the availblilty of 
water in region r. This equation limits the amount of irrigation water availble in the 
region and cannot be exceeded. The value for irrigation water availbility is initially 
determined by multipling the gross water requirement per hectare for each crop by the 
cuurent cropland for that crop and summing the result for all crops for each region. 
∑ ∑ 𝑋𝑐𝑗𝑟
𝐶
𝑐 𝑊𝑐𝑗𝑟 ≤ 𝑊0𝑟
𝐽
𝑗           (3.11) 
Table 3.5 shows cropland availability, irrigation water availability and the perennial 
crops for each region. 
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 Additionally, the study may suffer from aggregation error because it treats each 
region as a single farm, while in reality in a region farms are both numerous and 
heterogeneous in structure and size. Farms are not homogenous, because they have 
differences in the type of soil, the level of technology used, experience, and in access to 
capital. To this end, using aggregate data for region can result in an unrealistic solution. 
To develop a more appropriate solution, Onal and McCarl (1989) offer a method using 
aggregate data that enables the elimination of aggregation error.  Equation (3.12) 
accounts for the aggregation constraint. This restriction imposes crop production 
activities to fall into a convex combination of historical crop mixes (Onal and McCarl, 
1991, Kahil, et al., 2015). For that, there is no way the farmers have a single crop 
solution. h indicates the number of years, and 𝛼ℎ represents the weight assigned to each 
year of the crop mix observation. Equation (3.10) represents the standard non-negative 
constraints. 
𝑋𝑐𝑗𝑟 =  ∑ 𝛼ℎ𝑋𝑐𝑗ℎ𝑟ℎ  ; ∑ 𝛼ℎ = 1ℎ  ; 𝛼𝑛 ≥ 0       (3.12) 
𝑋𝑐𝑗𝑟 > 0           (3.13) 
By using an approach based on the work of Onal and McCarl (1989) that resolves 
aggregation error, the model does not suffer from the heterogeneity problem. 
3.7. National Model 
 The national model assumes the Saudi government has two potentially conflicting 
objectives: to reduce the total demand for irrigation water and to achieve an acceptable 
level of food security. The model uses total revenue from crop production as a proxy to 
measure food security. Although the government has other objectives, such as, increasing 
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farmers’ income, increasing the contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP, 
diversifying teh rurla economy and minimizing the government expenditure on the 
agricultural sector; the dissertation focuses on the two objectives as the government’s 
objectives.  
 The food security objective has a positive relationship with total irrigation water 
used, so increasing the level of food security requires an increase in the consumption of 
irrigation water.  As a result, there is also a potential conflict between the government’s 
objective and the farm’s objective. The government looks to maximize the total revenue 
to maximize the value of food production, while the farm’s objective is to maximize 
profit. 
 The law in Saudi Arabia states that all the natural resources under the ground are 
owned by the country and managed by the government. Therefore, there is an unwritten 
contractual relationship between the government and farmers when using groundwater 
resources. The government expects that when it lets farmers use groundwater that farmers 
will help to achieve the acceptable level of food security and will use the irrigation water 
in ways that minimize the use of irrigation water. However, the farmers have their 
objectives, which is maximizing the profit and farmers do not pay for the water they use. 
Consequently, the Saudi government faces at Principle-Agent problem because objectives 
of the two parties are not aligned the government allows farmers to use the groundwater 
with the expectation they will act in ways that satisfy its objectives, while the farmers 
will use the water to maximize their profit.  
 To model this relationship where two parties have different objectives that are 
linked through behavior a bi-level, multi-objective, multi-follower structure is used.  
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In the national model, the leader is the government, and it aims to minimize the total 
irrigation water used by allocating some given quantity of irrigation water among the 
regions (farms) in a way that can satisfy a specific total revenue constraint. Each farm can 
then use no more than its allocated quantity of irrigation water to maximize its profit. 
However the profit maximizing crop choice is unlikely to satisfy the government’s total 
revenue objective. The next section provides the theoretical model, the empirical model 
and the two algorithms that are used to solve the bi-level, multi-objective, multi-follower 
optimization problem.  
 Theoretical Model 3.7.1.
3.7.1.1.  General Formulation of Bi-level Programming Problem 
(BLPP) 
 According to Bard (1988) and Colson et al. (2007), a Stackelberg type game is the 
starting point to solve a bi-level programming problem. The basic framework of a 
Stackelberg game considers the case of a single leader (upper-level decision maker) and a 
follower (lower level decision maker), or multiple-followers. Each of the leader and 
follower(s) has a strategy. Suppose, the leader has the strategy 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 ⊆ ℝ𝑛1 where 𝑥 is 
the decision vector that is an element of set 𝑋 ⊆ ℝ𝑛1. On the other hand, each follower 
individually has a strategy set 𝑌𝑝 where the follower selects 𝑦𝑝(𝑥) to optimize its 
objective where 𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑌𝑖 ⊆ ℝ𝑛2𝑖 where i=1, 2… I is the number of followers. The 
objective of the leader is denoted as 𝐹(𝑥,𝑦) while the follower’s objective is 𝑓𝑖(𝑥,𝑦𝑖). 
Assume the leader goes first and selects x to optimize the objective function 𝐹(𝑥,𝑦(𝑥)), 
where 𝑦(𝑥) shows the leader’s problem is implicitly the y variable. Therefore, the 
follower observes x, then optimize their objective function  𝑓𝑖(𝑥,𝑦𝑖) subject to follower 
 51 
 
constraints for the value of x chosen. The general formulation of the bi-level 
programming problem is given in Definition 3.1. 
Definition 3.1 based on Bard (1988) and Colson et al. (2007) for 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 ⊆ ℝ𝑛1,𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 ⊆
ℝ𝑛2, 𝐹: 𝑋 × 𝑌 → ℝ, and 𝑓: 𝑋 × 𝑌 → ℝ, the general bi-level programming problem 
defined as: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑥∈𝑋,𝑦 𝐹(𝑥,𝑦)                (Leader)                (3.14) 
subject to  𝐺(𝑥,𝑦) ≤ 0}, 
where for each x given by the upper level, y solves the lower level problem: 
  𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑦𝑓(𝑥,𝑦)     (Follower) 
     subject to   𝑔(𝑥,𝑦) ≤ 0   
where the decision variables for the leader and follower are x and y respectively. The 
functions  𝐹 and 𝑓 are the leader and follower objective function respectively. Similarly, 
the vector valued functions 𝐺: ℝ𝑛1 × ℝ𝑛2 → ℝ𝑚1 and 𝑔: ℝ𝑛1 × ℝ𝑛2 → ℝ𝑚2 are the 
leader and follower respective constraints. 
Definitions 3.2 Bard (1988), Colson et al. (2007) and Zhang et al. (2015) 
a) Constraint region of bi-level linear programming problem (BLPP) 
𝑆 = {(𝑥,𝑦):𝑥 ∈ 𝑋,𝑦 ∈ 𝑌,𝐺(𝑥,𝑦) ≤ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔(𝑥,𝑦) ≤ 0} 
b) Projection of the constraint region onto Leader’s decision space 
𝑆(𝑋) = {𝑥 ∈ 𝑋:∃ 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌,𝐺(𝑥,𝑦) ≤ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔(𝑥,𝑦)} 
c) Follower’s feasible region for ?̅? ∈ 𝑋 fixed 
𝑃(?̅?) = {𝑦 ∈ 𝑌:𝑔(?̅?,𝑦) ≤ 0} 
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d) Follower’s rational reaction set for 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆(𝑋)  
𝑅(?̅?) = {𝑦 ∈ 𝑌:𝑦 ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑓(?̅?,𝑦�):𝑦� ∈ 𝑃(?̅?)}} 
e) Inducible region or feasible region of the leader 
𝐼𝑅 = {(𝑥,𝑦): 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆(𝑋),𝑦 ∈ 𝑅(𝑥)} 
Also, Bard (1988) has the following assumption to ensure the problem above has 
an optimal solution. 
Assumption 1. S is nonempty and compact. 
Assumption 2. The follower has some room to respond to the leader’s decision,  
𝑅(𝑥) ≠ ∅ 
Assumption 3.  𝑅(𝑥) is a point to point map with respect to x. 
3.7.1.2. Bi-level multi-follower programming problem (BLMF) 
 The bi-level programming problem, described above, has a single leader and 
follower with independent objectives. However, in the real world, the leader’s decision is 
often affected by the objectives and choices of many follower decision. Therefore, each 
follower has his or her reaction to the leader’s choices. Also, the leader’s decision is 
influenced by the relationship among the followers, and the relationship among followers 
may vary. The followers may share decision variables or have a common objective 
function or share the constraints. Also, they may have a combination of several elements 
such as each follower has individual decision variables and objective function but they 
share the constraints. Therefore, Zhang et al. (2015) explain the main kinds of the 
relationship among followers, which is determined by the form of sharing of decision 
variables and these relations are provided by Lu et al. (2006):  
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(1) Uncooperative situation: in this situation the followers are not sharing of 
decision variables between them. In other words, the followers do not share the objective 
function and constraints. 
(2) Cooperative situation: in this situation the followers share the decision 
variables. So, the followers share the decision variables on objective function and 
constraints. 
(3) Semi-cooperative situation: in this situation, the followers share the decision 
variables, therefore they may share objective function, but they do not share the decision 
variables on constraints, on vice versa. 
(4) Reference-uncooperative situation: in this situation the followers have 
individual decision variables, but each follower takes other followers variables as a 
reference when s/he makes the decision. 
 Also, Zhang et al. (2015) and Lu et al. (2012) provide concepts that reflect the 
features of Bi-level Multi-follower (BLMF) programming problem. These concepts 
identify and classify the BLMF as the following: 
(1) Neighborhood entities: two decision entities are at the same level and led by 
the leader. 
(2) Cooperative entities: two neighborhood entities share their decision variables, 
objective functions, and constraints. 
(3) Semi-cooperative entities: two neighborhood entities share their decision 
variables, but each entity has own objective function and constraints. 
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(4) Uncooperative entities: two neighborhood entities have individual decision 
variables, objective function, and constraints. 
(5) Reference-uncooperative entities: two neighborhood entities have individual 
decision variables, objective function, and constraints but consider others’ 
decision as a reference. For example, there are two followers (A) and (B). 
Each follower has own decision variables, objective function, and constraints 
but A looks to B decision variable as a reference to determine its decision 
variables. For that, B’s decision variables may show into A’s objective 
function or constraints. 
 The dissertation assumes the relationship between followers is uncooperative in 
which followers have individual decision variables, objective functions, and constraints. 
The following section provides the general formulation of bi-level programming with 
uncooperative multi-followers. The general framework of the bilevel multi-follower 
programming problem with an uncooperative situation can be defined as Definition 3.3. 
Definition 3.3 (Bard, 1988 and Zhang et al. 2015) for 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 ⊆ ℝ𝑛1 and 𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑌𝑖 ⊆ ℝ𝑛2𝑖, 
i=1, 2, 3, …,I , the general bi-level programming problem with multi-follower defined as: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑥∈𝑋,𝑦 𝐹(𝑥,𝑦)                                      (leader)                   
(3.15) 
Subject to  𝐺(𝑥,𝑦) ≤ 0}, 
Where for each x given by the upper level, yi solves the lower level problem 
  𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑓𝑖(𝑥,𝑦𝑖)     𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝐼                       (Follower i) 
     Subject to   𝑔𝑖(𝑥,𝑦𝑖) ≤ 0   
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Where x and yi are the decision variables of the leader and follower (i) respectively, 𝑖 ≥ 2 
is the number of the follower. The function  𝐹: X × 𝑌1 × … .× 𝑌𝐼 → ℝ and 𝑓𝑖: X × 𝑌1 ×… .× 𝑌𝐼 → ℝ  are the leader and follower objective function respectively. The vector 
valued functions 𝐺: ℝ𝑛1 × ℝ𝑛21 × … .× ℝ𝑛2𝐼 → ℝ𝑚1 and 𝑔: ℝ𝑛1 × ℝ𝑛21 × … .× ℝ𝑛2𝐼 →
ℝ𝑚2𝑖 are the leader and lower constraints respectively. 
 So, for each value of x given by the leader, the follower will react by choosing the 
value of its decision variable yi under its constraints. In turn, the leader will be affected 
by the followers’ selection. Therefore, the model assumed the leader has full information 
about the followers’ behavior and understands their rational reaction set, 𝑅(𝑥). Thus, 
solution concepts can be defined as Definition 3.4: 
Definition 3.4 (Zhang et al. (2015), Bard (1988) and Colson et al. (2007)) 
a) Constraint Region of bi-level linear programming problem (BLPP) 
𝑆 = {(𝑥,𝑦1, … ,𝑦𝐼) ∈ X × 𝑌1 × … .× 𝑌𝐼:𝐺(𝑥,𝑦) ≤ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔(𝑥,𝑦) ≤ 0, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝐼} 
b) Projection of constraint region onto Leader’s decision space 
𝑆(𝑋) = {𝑥 ∈ 𝑋:∃ (𝑦1, … ,𝑦𝐼) ∈ 𝑌1 × … .× 𝑌𝐼 , (𝑥,𝑦1, … ,𝑦𝐼) ∈ 𝑆} 
c) Follower i’s a feasible region for ?̅? ∈ 𝑋 fixed 
𝑃𝑖(?̅?) = {𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑌𝑖:𝑔𝑖(?̅?,𝑦) ≤ 0} 
d) Follower rational reaction set  
𝑅𝑖(?̅?) = {𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑌𝑖:𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑓𝑖(?̅?,𝑦):𝑦 ∈ 𝑃𝑖(?̅?)}} 
e) Inducible region or feasible region of the leader 
𝐼𝑅 = {(𝑥,𝑦1, … ,𝑦𝐼): 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆(𝑋),𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑅𝑖(𝑥), 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼} 
Where the assumptions are; 
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Assumption 1. S is nonempty and compact. 
Assumption 2. 𝑅(𝑥) ≠ ∅ 
Assumption 3.  𝑅𝑖(𝑥) is a point to point map with respect to x. 
3.7.1.3. Bi-level multi-objective multi-follower programming problem 
(BLMOMF) 
3.7.1.3.1. THE BASIC CONCEPT IN MULTI-OBJECTIVE OPTIMIZATION 
 In reality, the decision-maker faces a multi-objective situation, and these 
objectives could be complementary, conflicting, or independent. Therefore, the decision-
maker faces a difficult-to-solve problem. If the decision-maker solves each objective 
subject to the constraints, the base solution of each problem can optimize one objective, 
but the others will not be optimized. So, a multi-objective programming problem has no 
unique solution, but there will be a set of solutions, and the best solution depends on the 
preferences of the decision-maker. Thus, a multi-objective optimization problem 
formulates in general as follows:  
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐹(𝒙) = [ 𝑓1(𝑥),𝑓2(𝑥), … ,𝑓𝑃(𝑥)]        (3.15) 
Subject to  
𝑔𝑖(𝑥) ≤ 0  where i=1, 2, 3… m , 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0 
 Based on Cohon and Marks (1975), and Yamashita et al. (2016): 𝐹(𝒙) a vector of 
P objective is a function 𝑓𝑝(𝑥) where p =1,..,P, Function  𝑔𝑖(𝑥) ≤ 0 represents the 
constraints of the problem, 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 ⊂ ℝ𝑛 is a vector of decision variables where n is the 
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number of independent variables 𝑥𝑖 , X represents the feasible decision space and is 
defined as 
 𝑋 = {𝑥:𝑔𝑖(𝑥) ≤ 0, 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0}, 
 Also, the feasible objective space Z is mapping from the feasible decision space 
through implies each value of 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 into 𝑓𝑝(𝑥), and then Z defined on the p-dimensional 
vector space, 
𝑍 = {𝑧: 𝑧 = 𝐹(𝑥),𝑥 ∈ 𝑋}. 
Definition 3.4 (Marler and Arora, 2004) the feasible solution 𝑥∗ ∈ 𝑋 is Pareto optimal 
for decision maker if and only if there does not exist another solution. 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, such 
as𝐹(𝑥) ≤ 𝐹(𝑥∗), and 𝐹𝑝(𝑥) ≤ 𝐹𝑝(𝑥∗) for at least one function. 
Definition 3.5 (Marler and Arora, 2004), Weakly Pareto optimal point: a point, 𝑥∗ ∈ 𝑋, is 
weakly optimal if and only if there does not exist another point, 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, such that 𝐹(𝑥) <
𝐹(𝑥∗). 
 Solving a multi-objective programming problem usually does not provide a single 
solution, but instead, a set of Pareto Optimal points and these points can be shown to be a 
feasible objective region. A Pareto Optimal point represents a vector of the decision 
variable which, if there is no other vector, optimizes some objective function without 
causing simultaneous negative or positive effects, on at least one other objective function. 
So, the Pareto Optimal subset that optimizes the value of the objective function represents 
the set of efficient trade-offs among objectives. This subset could be called a 
nondominated solution (or Pareto curve, or Pareto front), and all of the points on this 
 58 
 
curve are strictly or strongly Pareto Optimal. Often, mathematical programming 
algorithms provide a solution that is not Pareto Optimal, but it may satisfy other criteria 
and can be considered to be weakly Pareto Optimal. A Pareto Optimal point is a weakly 
Pareto Optimal point if no other point improves all objective functions simultaneously. In 
other words, the solution is weakly Pareto Optimal when “there is no other alternative 
way for resource allocation to make any individual better off” (Cho et al., 2016). Hence, 
all points on the Pareto curve have an equally acceptable solution for the decision-maker, 
and the point that the decision-maker selects represents the highest-level preference of the 
decision-maker. Therefore, the multi-objective optimization problem is classified based 
on the preferences of a decision-maker regarding three categories: (1) a priori Preference 
approach, (2) Progressive Preference approach, and (3) a posteriori Preference approach, 
Sinha, (2011). 
 An a priori Preference approach can be described as shown in Figure 3.2.a where 
the decision-maker provide his/her preference before computing the solution. This 
method assumes that the decision-maker has prior information about his/her preference, 
how the objectives are interdependent, and the feasible objective values. For instance, the 
decision-maker could order or rank the objectives from most important to least. For that, 
Hakanen. et al. (2013)5 mention the properties of this method as follows: (1) There is an 
accessible path to obtain the preference information through asking the decision-maker 
directly, and (2) For all possible preferences, the solution found is Pareto Optimal. (3) 
Each Pareto Optimal solution can be found with some preference. However, no approach 
                                                 
 
5 The main reference is a lecture in http://users.jyu.fi/~jhaka/uppsala/  
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satisfies all of the above properties. On the other hand, this method faces some problems, 
such as (1) The decision-maker may not know the feasible region, (2) The decision-
maker may not know or understand his/her preferences very well, and (3) This method 
has no feedback, and there is a possibility that the best solution could be missed. Also, 
this approach features a group of techniques such as the Weighted Sum, Utility Theory, 
Fuzzy Logic, Goal Programming, and Lexicographic approaches (Andersson, 2000). 
 The second method shown in Figure 3.2.b describe the Progressive Preference 
approach. The technique of this method operates in three stages: (1) Find the Pareto front 
where there is no a priori preference information. (2) The decision-maker provides a 
reaction regarding the Pareto front and modifies the preference for the objectives. (3) 
Repeat the two previous steps until the decision-maker is satisfied (Chiandussi et al., 
2012). The advantage of this method is that no prior preference information is required, 
and the preference develops from learning. On the other hand, the solutions depend on 
the decision maker's preference, and when the preference changes, the solutions also 
change.  Thus, all of these methods would solve the multi-objective optimization problem 
and would provide a Pareto Optimal solution, but the main difference lies in how the 
decision-maker affects the Pareto Optimal outcome. 
 The third method is the a posteriori Preference approach is shown in Figure 3.2.c 
where the decision-maker searches for the solution space and then makes the decision. 
With this method, the decision maker's preference is independent of the solution. Hence, 
the decision-maker will get a set of Pareto Optimal outcomes that do not change, since 
there is no change in the problem description. In contrast, the decision-maker would face 
a large selection of possible solutions, and it could be difficult to choose the best one. 
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Another disadvantage is that some of the approaches need significant computational 
resources. A posteriori Preference approach offers a set of approaches to find out the 
solution, and Andersson (2000) divided this method into two parts: multiple-run 
approaches and multi-objective genetic algorithm. The current study focuses on multiple-
run approaches such as weighted sum approaches and the ε-constraint approach. Solving 
these approaches provides a set of points on the Pareto Optimal front. The dissertation 
uses a posteriori Preference approach since there is no available preference information 
for the decision-maker. 
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Figure 3.2a: A priori Preference approach 
 
Figure 3.2.b: Progressive Preference approach 
 
Figure 3.2.c: posterior Preference approach 
 
Figure  3-2 How decision maker under multi-objective chooses the decision 
Source: Sinha, A. (2011). 
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3.7.1.3.2. THE BASIC CONCEPT OF BI-LEVEL MULTI-OBJECTIVE MULTI-FOLLOWER 
PROGRAMMING PROBLEM (BLMOMF) 
This section provides the general formulation for a bi-level multi-objective leader with 
multi-followers who have a single objective. The general framework of BLMOMF 
problem follows Definition 3.6 
Definition 3.6 for 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 ⊆ ℝ𝑛1 and 𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑌𝑖 ⊆ ℝ𝑛2𝑖, i=1, 2, 3, …,I , the general bi-level 
programming with multi-objective and multi-follower problem defined as: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑥∈𝑋,𝑦 𝐹(𝑥,𝑦) = �𝐹1(𝑥,𝑦),𝐹2(𝑥,𝑦), … ,𝐹𝑝(𝑥,𝑦)�  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑝 = 1,2, … ,𝑃(Leader)(3.16) 
Subject to  𝐺(𝑥,𝑦) ≤ 0}, 
Where for each x given by the upper level, yi solves the lower level problem 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑓𝑖(𝑥,𝑦𝑖)     𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝐼                                                              (Follower i) 
      Subject to   𝑔𝑖(𝑥,𝑦𝑖) ≤ 0   
Where x and 𝑦 = 𝑦1, … ,𝑦𝐼 are the decision variables of the upper level decision maker 
and lower level (i) decision maker respectively, i is the number of the follower. The 
function  𝐹𝑝: ℝ𝑛1 × ℝ𝑛21 × ℝ𝑛22 × … .× ℝ𝑛2𝐼 → ℝ and 𝑓𝑖: ℝ𝑛1 × ℝ𝑛21 × ℝ𝑛22 × … .×
ℝ𝑛2𝐼 → ℝ  are the upper level and lower level objective function respectively, where p is 
the number of the objective function of the upper level. The vector valued functions 
𝐺: ℝ𝑛1 × ℝ𝑛21 × ℝ𝑛22 × … .× ℝ𝑛2𝐼 → ℝ𝑚1 and 𝑔: ℝ𝑛1 × ℝ𝑛21 × ℝ𝑛22 × … .× ℝ𝑛2𝐼 →
ℝ𝑚2𝑖 are the upper level and lower level constraints respectively. 
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Definition 3.6 (Zhang et al. (2015), Bard (1988) and (Xu, et al., 2016) 
a) Constraint Region of bi-level linear programming problem (BLPP) 
𝑆 = {(𝑥,𝑦1, … ,𝑦𝐼) ∈ X × 𝑌1 × … .× 𝑌𝐼:𝐺(𝑥,𝑦) ≤ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔(𝑥,𝑦) ≤ 0,  𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝐼} 
b) Projection of constraint region onto Leader’s decision space 
𝑆(𝑋) = {𝑥 ∈ 𝑋:∃ (𝑦1, … ,𝑦𝐼) ∈ 𝑌1 × … .× 𝑌𝐼 , (𝑥,𝑦1, … ,𝑦𝐼) ∈ 𝑆} 
c) Follower i’s a feasible region for ?̅? ∈ 𝑋 fixed 
𝑃𝑖(?̅?) = {𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑌𝑖:𝑔𝑖(?̅?,𝑦) ≤ 0} 
d) Follower rational reaction set  
𝑅𝑖(?̅?) = {𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑌𝑖:𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑓𝑖(?̅?,𝑦):𝑦 ∈ 𝑃𝑖(?̅?)}} 
e) Inducible region or feasible region of the leader 
𝐼𝑅 = {(𝑥,𝑦1, … ,𝑦𝐼): 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆(𝑋),𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑅𝑖(𝑥), 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼} 
So, the final step is to search about Pareto Optimal solution in the inducible region and 
that defined in definition 3.7:  
Definition 3.7 (Xu et al., 2016) (𝑥∗, 𝑦∗) is a Pareto optimal solution if and only if there 
exists on other (𝑥,𝑦) ∈ 𝐼𝑅 such that 𝐹𝑝(𝑥,𝑦) ≥ 𝐹𝑝(𝑥∗, 𝑦∗) for all p = 1,2,…,P with strict 
inequality for at least one p. 
3.7.1.3.3. SOLVING THE BI-LEVEL MULTI-OBJECTIVE WITH MULTI-FOLLOWER 
PROGRAMMING PROBLEM (BLMOMF) 
The dissertation focuses on multiple run approaches, such as weighted sum, ε-constraint 
approach. Solving these approaches obtains a set of efficient solutions and there is a 
subset point of the Pareto Optimal front. 
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 The ε-constraint method is one of the simplest approaches and could be one of the 
most widely used to optimize the multi-objective problem. The main goal of this method 
is to transfer the multi-objective optimization problem into a single-objective 
optimization problem through the decision-maker keeps only one objective and 
reformulated the rest of objective as constraints. In other words, the other objective 
functions are incorporated into the constraints as shown below: 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑓1(𝑥,𝑦)    (Leader problem)                                 (3.17) 
 Subject to 
𝑓𝑗(𝑥,𝑦) ≥ 𝑒𝑗 where j=2, 3, … p 
𝑔𝑖(𝑥,𝑦) ≤ 0  where i=1, 2, 3… m 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑦𝑖  𝑓𝑖(𝑥,𝑦𝑖)                𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝐼            (Follower problem) 
       Subject to   𝑔𝑖(𝑥,𝑦𝑖) ≥ 0   
The leader has one prime objective, and the rest of the objectives became 
constraints. So, the right-hand side of the leader constraints represents by (ei) which is the 
efficient solutions or the leader optimization objectives of the problem. By changing the 
constraint values, 𝑒𝑗, and running the problem mulitple times provides different points 
that are optimal. Therefore, this method could be used for non-convex multi-objective 
optimization problesm. However, this method has some disadvantage, such as: the 
solution of this probem depends on the range of the  𝑒𝑗 value, where the  𝑒𝑗value range lie 
between the minimum and maximum value of each objective function, Also, the 
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decision-maker needs more information for choices of 𝑒𝑗  ,where increasing the number of 
objectives that are reformuated as constriants. 
Also, Mavrotas (2009) finds the ε-constraint approach has some advantage over 
the weighting approach. Such as, the weighting approach involves scaling the objective 
function and that influences the result, while the ε-constraint approach does not require 
scaling the objective function. Also, the user in the ε-constraint approach “can control the 
number generated efficient solutions by properly adjusting the number of grid points in 
each one of the objective function ranges. This is not so easy with the weighting 
method”. 
The dissertation uses the ε-constraint method because it is the simplest method 
and the focus of the dissertation is on developing a model that could help decision-
makers in Saudi Arabia reach an acceptable level of total revenue while reducing water 
use in agriculture without imposing extra conditions on the nature of the objective 
function. 
3.8. Empirical model 
 The model used in this dissertation assumes there are two levels of decision 
makers and each decision maker on each level tries to optimize its objectives. Therefore, 
the model contains seven problems. The first problem is the government problem in 
which the government has two conflicting objectives, which are, minimizing irrigation 
water used, 𝐹1equation (3.18), and maximizing total return from agricultural 
production 𝐹2 equation (3.19). To solve the government problem, the model adopts the ε-
constraint method where the government aims to minimize irrigation water and uses the 
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second objective as a constraint. The rest of the problems are for each region and apply 
the regional model where each region (farm) solves its own sub-problem to find the crop 
pattern that maximizes profit. The government problem starts from equations (3.20) to 
(3.26), while the sub-problem starts from equations (3.21) to (3.26) which represent the 
regional model for each region.  
 Initially, the government solves the master problem to minimize the total 
irrigation water requirement, equation (3.20), subject to a specific choice for the second 
objective, which is the maximum of the total revenue, and the farm problem for all 
regions. 𝐺𝑊𝑅𝑐𝑗𝑟 represents the average of five years gross water requirement of crop c 
per hectare under j farm type in region r. 𝑌𝑐𝑗𝑟 represents the average of five years of crop 
yield production per hectare of crop c under j farm type in region r and 𝑋𝑐𝑗𝑟 is the 
decision variable of the area of crop c under farm type j, in region r. 
 When the government minimizes the total irrigation water used, it also calculates 
the maximum output that must be produced in each region to satisfy the total revenue 
constraint. If the total revenue is less than the target (current) level, the government 
increases the total irrigation water used until the total revenue is greater or equal than the 
current level. With this water level, the government knows it is technically feasible to 
produce current total revenue with its chosen quantity of irrigation water. After that, the 
government assigns irrigation water quantities to each region through equation (3.24) 
where 𝑊𝑐𝑗𝑟 is the parameter that determines by the government. The total water 
availability,𝑊0𝑟 is calculated by the government through, ∑ ∑ 𝐺𝑊𝑅𝑐𝑗𝑟𝑋𝑐𝑗𝑟
𝐽
𝑗
𝐶
𝑐  which is the 
summation of all gross crop irrigation requirements for all the crops under the different 
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farm technologies. Farms (regions) then maximize profit subject to the new irrigation 
water availability through applying equations (3.22) to (3.26), which is the regional 
model. 
 Farm output from the six regions may or may not reach the government’s total 
revenue target, because farmers maximize profit while the government focus is on total 
revenue that is used as a proxy to measure the level of the food security target. If farm 
production does not satisfy the total revenue constraint, the government has to provide 
more water or other policies that encourage farmers to satisfy the total revenue constraint. 
The policies could be subsidies or taxation. 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝐹1 = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐺𝑊𝑅𝑐𝑗𝑟𝑋𝑐𝑗𝑟𝐽𝑗𝐶𝑐𝑅𝑟          (3.18) 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐹2 = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑐𝑟𝑌𝑐𝑗𝑟𝑋𝑐𝑗𝑟𝐽𝑗𝐶𝑐𝑅𝑟          (3.19) 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝐹1 = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐺𝑊𝑅𝑐𝑗𝑟𝑋𝑐𝑗𝑟𝐽𝑗𝐶𝑐𝑅𝑟                             Leader Problem                      (3.20) 
Subject to  
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑐𝑟𝑌𝑐𝑗𝑟𝑋𝑐𝑗𝑟 ≥  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝐽𝑗𝐶𝑐𝑅𝑟                    (Second objective)                     (3.21) 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑍𝑟 = ∑ ∑ (𝑅𝑐𝑗𝑟 − 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑟)𝐶𝑐𝐽𝑗 𝑋𝑐𝑗𝑟                      Follower problem                         (3.22) 
∑ ∑ 𝑋𝑐𝑗𝑟
𝐶
𝑐 ≤ 𝐴𝑟
𝐽
𝑗                                                    (3.23) 
∑ ∑ 𝑋𝑐𝑗𝑟
𝐶
𝑐 𝑊𝑐𝑗𝑟 ≤ 𝑊0𝑟
𝐽
𝑗    where 𝑊0𝑟 = ∑ ∑ 𝐺𝑊𝑅𝑐𝑗𝑟𝑋𝑐𝑗𝑟𝐽𝑗𝐶𝑐      (3.24) 
𝑋𝑐𝑗𝑟 =  ∑ 𝛼ℎ𝑋𝑐𝑗ℎ𝑟ℎ ; ∑ 𝛼ℎ = 1ℎ  ; 𝛼𝑛 ≥ 0                                          (3.25) 
       𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑟 ≥ 0, 𝑊0𝑟 ≥ 0          (3.26) 
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3.9. Key assumption of model 
To solve the model, there are four main assumption  
1. Prices used are accurate representation of prices that farmers face. 
2. Crop yield functions are accurate. 
3. The aggregation constraints allows sufficient flexibility in crop choice, while 
satisfying the government’s desire for relatively stable levels of output for each 
crop. 
4. Total crop revenue is a reasonable proxy for food security.  
 3.10.  Algorithms for solving the bi-level model 
The dissertation provides two algorithms to solve the bi-level, multi-objective, 
multi-follower problem. The first algorithm is reallocated irrigation water policy (RIWP) 
while the second algorithm is Integrated Irrigation Water Management Policy (IIWMP). 
Figure 3.3 shows the steps of the Reallocated Irrigation Water Policy (RIWP) 
algorithm. The government minimizes the total irrigation water used among regions by 
distributing a specific quantity of irrigation water among the regions that it knows is 
technically enough to satisfy its food security constraint. In this approach the government 
implicitly assumes that there is no PA problem between its objectives and the region 
objectives. First the government optimizes its objective function by minimizing the total 
irrigation water subject to, achieving the desired total revenue level and the constraints of 
all six regional models. Then the government determines the quantity of irrigation water 
available for each region. Based on the government’s water allocation, each farm will 
maximize profits subject to the new irrigation water availability and other constraints. 
The algorithm operates only by reallocating the quantity of irrigation water among the 
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regions to minimize total irrigation water consumption and does not introduce any 
feedback from farmers’ actions. However, farmers’ decisions may or may not meet the 
government’s objectives. Farmers will not meet government objectives when a gap exists 
between the government’s and farmers’ objectives. Because the two sets of objectives are 
fundamentally different simply altering the irrigation constraint is unlikely to produce an 
acceptable outcome for the government. Therefore, the government has to intervene 
through other policies, such as subsidies or taxation, in addition to reallocating irrigation 
water.  
The second approach to solving the national problem introduces crop and region 
specific subsidies to align the two sets of objectives. Figure 3.4 shows the IIWMP 
algorithm that closes the gap between the farmers’ objective and the government’s 
objectives. The algorithm starts by solving the government problems to minimize the 
total irrigation water used in the same way as in the first algorithm. However, if the 
solution of farmers does not satisfy the government’s objectives, the government 
compares the crop allocations made by farmers to those in its solution and provides 
appropriate subsidies and taxes alter the relative returns from crops. The government then 
solves the problem again and reexamines the output choices of farmers, and if needed 
alters the subsidies and taxes to move the farm (region) choices further toward its desired 
output mix. The algorithm keeps looping until these policies motivate farmers to adopt 
the government’s objectives and crop mix. 
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Figure  3-3 Reallocated Irrigation Water Policy Algorithm to solve the bi-level 
optimization 
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Figure  3-4 Integrated Irrigation Water Management Policy Algorithm to solve the bi-
level optimization 
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Table  3-5 Observed Total Crop Area for the regions under study 
 Riyadh Qaseem Eastern Tabuk Hail Jouf 
Return(W.P) 
 
9,544,190,906.7 3,674,119,444.1 2,713,291,096.3 963,804,032.7 1,909,263,947.9 1,277,654,214.6 
Profit (W.P) 5,038,510,451.3 2,342,006,328.1 1,754,885,946.9 477,806,680.8 1,152,909,311.0 381,393,061.1 
Cropland 
used 
234,877.4 101,254.4 53,762.2 44,405.8 81,628.2 94,481.2 
Irrigation 
water 
5,814,121,725.4 2,470,307,806.0 991,029,384.9 745,725,539.4 1,641,141,954.0 1,470,900,621.3 
Crops Area (ha) Yield Ton/ha Area (ha) 
Yield 
Ton/ha Area (ha) 
Yield 
Ton/ha Area (ha) 
Yield 
Ton/ha Area (ha) 
Yield 
Ton/ha Area (ha) 
Yield 
Ton/ha 
Wheat 30,646.2 5.1 20,308.6 5.4 25,853.4 4.8 19,486.6 6.4 22,721.8 7.2 49,967.0 7.1 
Barley 570.0 6.3 68.2 6.6 113.2 6.3 271.0 7.9 261.0 7.5 646.6 8.5 
Sorghum 207.4 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maize 1,852.2 4.5 1,355.0 4.6 120.0 4.1 4.0 3.5 13,422.4 6.2 435.8 5.5 
Millet 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sesame 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other Cereal 40.2 3.6 21.4 2.4 182.6 3.9 0.0 0.0 9.0 2.4 13.6 5.0 
Tomato 3,735.1 15.3 112.4 20.3 533.5 18.6 534.9 19.9 88.8 19.3 649.5 14.1 
Tomato 
(GH) 
1,734.5 81.3 588.4 79.4 598.9 81.4 77.3 92.8 486.6 67.2 114.9 99.9 
Eggplant 1,790.4 14.6 159.4 17.4 105.6 20.5 37.2 13.7 236.2 16.6 33.2 17.6 
Squash 3,003.0 19.3 892.5 16.9 157.1 15.7 24.7 13.4 380.4 16.5 102.5 16.0 
Squash 
(GH) 
21.2 114.0 42.5 98.2 43.1 79.1 41.7 57.7 4.8 101.4 22.1 67.9 
Cucumber 191.2 20.5 44.5 16.7 9.0 19.3 18.3 20.4 31.8 20.1 23.5 15.3 
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Continue 
table Area (ha) 
Yield 
Ton/ha Area (ha) 
Yield 
Ton/ha Area (ha) 
Yield 
Ton/ha Area (ha) 
Yield 
Ton/ha Area (ha) 
Yield 
Ton/ha Area (ha) 
Yield 
Ton/ha 
Cucumber 
(GH) 
1,432.0 87.9 308.9 68.7 192.6 84.1 221.9 102.9 49.6 55.0 61.7 86.4 
Okra 1,122.2 14.1 135.6 16.3 183.0 13.9 19.8 11.2 62.0 14.4 88.4 11.4 
Carrots 1,680.8 15.8 1,389.0 17.8 12.2 19.6 3.6 20.1 24.4 16.3 74.8 18.4 
Potatoes 4,512.6 22.8 3,737.4 23.3 40.8 21.0 1,468.2 26.3 4,843.4 29.1 1,282.6 26.1 
Dry Onion 1,091.4 28.1 277.4 23.6 126.0 15.6 351.0 28.1 335.6 23.3 1,188.8 29.2 
Melon 10,924.4 19.1 672.2 26.2 150.0 15.6 164.2 24.8 135.4 23.3 31.0 20.1 
Watermelon 12,983.6 19.5 981.6 19.6 59.6 15.4 171.0 17.9 3,318.4 24.8 35.8 17.8 
Other 
Vegetables 
9,367.4 18.7 2,466.0 22.0 1,358.8 19.1 555.6 18.5 164.5 16.9 77.1 14.9 
Other 
Vegetables  
  
805.2 59.1 66.8 70.3 220.0 120.2 30.2 80.3 14.7 71.9 4.9 106.3 
Alfalfa 60,820.0 20.1 19,104.8 21.5 2,695.0 19.2 9,849.6 20.8 8,280.0 21.4 12,603.4 23.1 
Other 
Fodder 
33,511.2 20.5 4,683.6 16.4 2,476.6 14.0 581.6 20.0 4,701.4 17.7 510.2 18.3 
Dates 42,419.6 6.5 39,140.0 5.1 14,403.8 10.9 3,302.6 6.8 17,214.0 6.0 5,215.0 8.7 
Citrus 3,374.4 8.3 1,584.6 6.0 759.2 15.7 1,187.6 13.1 1,441.2 9.4 716.8 7.0 
Grapes 2,806.8 11.6 1,662.2 13.0 149.0 30.7 1,227.4 4.8 1,121.2 10.1 1,371.8 15.1 
Other Fruits 4,234.4 4.6 1,451.4 8.2 3,219.2 12.3 4,775.8 8.4 2,279.6 7.7 19,210.2 4.1 
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Table  3-6 wholesale prices of crops, total return, and profit for regions under study 
 Riyadh Qaseem Eastern Tabuk Hail Jouf 
Return 9,544,190,906.7 3,674,119,444.1 2,713,291,096.3 963,804,032.7 1,909,263,947.9 1,277,654,214.6 
Profit  5,038,510,451.3 2,342,006,328.1 1,754,885,946.9 477,806,680.8 1,152,909,311.0 381,393,061.1 
Crops Prices SR/Ton 
Cost 
SR/ha 
Prices 
SR/Ton Cost SR/ha 
Prices 
SR/Ton 
Cost 
SR/ha 
Prices 
SR/Ton 
Cost 
SR/ha 
Prices 
SR/Ton Cost SR/ha 
Prices 
SR/Ton 
Cost 
SR/ha 
Wheat 1,120a 7,155.8d 1,120.0a 6,383.9d 1,120.0a 4,646.8d 1,120.0a 3,748.9d 1,120.0a 7,097.8d 1,120.0a 5566.5d 
Barley 1,115a 10,435.4d 1,115.0a 5,823.9d 1,115.0a 6,604.0d 1,115.0a 9,595.3d 1,115.0a 3,921.4d 1,115.0a 8337.5d 
Sorghum 1,880.7b 7,600.2e 1,880.7b 0.0 1,880.7b 0.0 1,880.7b 0.0 1,880.7b 0.0 1,880.7b 0.0 
Maize 1,101a 6,932.8e 1,101.0a 4,738.8e 1,101.0a 4,098.4e 1,101.0a 3,119.1e 1,101.0a 4,734.2e 1,101.0a 4836.8e 
Millet 1,226a - 1,226.0a - 1,226.0a - 1,226.0a - 1,226.0a - 1,226.0a - 
Sesame 5,357a - 5,357.0a - 5,357.0a - 5,357.0a - 5,357.0a - 5,357.0a - 
Other Cereal 2,506a 5,478.4e 2,506.0a 2,466.1e 2,506.0a 3,932.3e 2,506.0a - 2,506.0a 1,852.2e 2,506.0a 4376.0e 
Tomato 2,368c 22,990.5d 3,104.0c 12,299.8d 3,064.0c 13,332.3d 2,236.0c 8,465.2d 2,296.0c 2,177.9d 2,158.0c 21178.5d 
Tomato (GH) 2,368c 247,149.5f 3,104.0c 285,114.3d 3,064.0c 54,387.4d 2,236.0c 28,026.0d 2,296.0c 22,966.2d 2,158.0c 71208.8d 
Eggplant 2,060c 12,090.3d 2,158.0c 7,309.7d 2,792.0c 18,908.4d 1,532.0c 10,144.7d 2,222.0c 3,431.5d 2,248.0c 3564.2d 
Squash 3,620c 13,619.2d 2,800.0c 13,333.0d 3,878.0c 13,721.6d 2,380.0c 9,199.3d 3,392.0c 15,840.0d 2,588.0c 30616.9d 
Squash (GH) 3,620c 157,696.7d 2,800.0c 296,630.9e 3,878.0c 76,666.0d 2,380.0c 250,978.8
d 
3,392.0c 158,095.7d 2,588.0c 41539.8e 
Cucumber 3,088c 9,259.3d 2,304.0c 7,507.3d 2,854.0c 16,197.7d 2,074.0c 13,323.8d 2,552.0c 17,682.3d 2,768.0c 2509.3d 
Cucumber 
(GH) 
3,088c 195,322d 2,304.0c 168,148.7d 2,854.0c 379,212.6d 2,074.0c 97,927.8d 2,552.0c 56,919.5d 2,768.0c 44125.3d 
Okra 8,462c 21,554.4d 6,588c 6,933.5d 11,706c 29,130.6d 8,268c 6,474.8d 7,874c 2,388.8d 6,694c 5143.4d 
Carrots 2,048c 13,369e 1,454c 8,285.1e 3,226c 23,425.3e 1,720c 11,407.4e 1,414c 9,690.1e 2,144c 12343.5e 
Potatoes 1,406c 8,567.2d 1,218c 14,928.3d 1,740c 9,697.5d 1,120c 12,772.5d 1,304c 40,436d 1,452c 15385.2d 
Dry Onion 1,590c 22,218.4d 1,062c 7,495.6d 1,698c 13,636.8d 1,748c 6,240.4d 1,054c 2,911.7d 1,276c 12631.9d 
Melon 2,658c 5,685.7d 1,848.0c 7,227.4d 2,500c 31,076.4d 1,865c 16,239.4d 1,988.0c 17,528.2d 1,910.0c 8126.1d 
Watermelon 2,728c 5,794.4d 1,536.0c 5,423.4d 2,240c 30,703.6d 2,914c 11,744.3d 1,680.0c 18,657.0d 1,556.0c 7206.3d 
Other 
V t bl  
4,401c 15,810.1e 4,325.3c 10,268.5e 6,740c 22,829.9e 4,770c 10,484.2e 4,359.0c 10,033.4e 3,956.7c 9998.2e 
Other Vegetables   ( 
GH) 4,401
c 125,502.4e 4,325.3c 212,180.4e 6,740c 190,684d 4,770.0c 47,255.5e 4,359.0c 70,382.6e 3,956.7c 65081.1e 
Alfalfa 1,346a 11,228.3d 1,346.0a 6,229.0d 1,346a 8,658.5d 1,346.0a 6,539.9d 1,346.0a 6,224.6d 1,346.0a 8777.1d 
Other Fodder 1,532a 28,198d 1,532.0a 6,590.5d 1,532a 9,545.3d 1,532.0a 11,186.5d 1,532.0a 5,940.6d 1,532.0a 13267.8d 
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Continue of Table 3.6 
 Riyadh Qaseem Eastern Tabuk Hail Jouf 
Crops Prices SR/Ton 
Cost 
SR/ha 
Prices 
SR/Ton Cost SR/ha 
Prices 
SR/Ton 
Cost 
SR/ha 
Prices 
SR/Ton 
Cost 
SR/ha 
Prices 
SR/Ton Cost SR/ha 
Prices 
SR/Ton 
Cost 
SR/ha 
Dates 9,219c 24,350.8d 10,122.3c 15,555.5d 9,451.2c 35,359.2d 12,094.9c 63,061.2d 6,017.3c 8,335.7d 8,859.5c 38099.6d 
Citrus 3,043c 30,677.4d 2,641c 4,038.4d 4,841c 12,209.3d 2,395.8c 21,958.3d 2,314.0c 4,778.3d 2,048.3c 14857.7d 
Grapes 5,028c 28,328.5d 2,641c 24,612.9d 5,806c 17,448.5d 2,804c 4,049.7d 4,772.0c 1,725.3d 4,680.0c 15230.9d 
Other Fruits 4,928c 15,105.2e 4,040c 15,499.3e 5,834c 18,834.5e 2,810c 32,829.8e 4,794.7c 5,348.4e 4,433.3c 10219.4e 
a. The price represents the value of imported price per ton for the period started from 2008 to 2013, and the source of the data is FAO. 
b. The price represents the value of imported price per ton for the period started from 2002 to 2007, and the source of the data is FAO. 
c. The price represents the whole price per ton for the period starting from 2009 to 2014, and the source of the data is MOA. 
d. The source of data is “Water and Food Security and Sustainable Development,” 2009. 
e. These data are represented as the average of the crop group. 
f. An estimate by Al-Kahtani and Ismaiel (1997) equation. 
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 MODEL SCENARIO RESULTS CHAPTER 4.
4.1. Introduction 
The chapter covers the primary analysis various model scenarios that were 
presented in Chapter 3. The first part of the chapter examines how well the regional 
model replicated the historical crop pattern for Riyadh region. The desired result is that 
the observed crop pattern and the optimal crop pattern from the model will be similar. 
However, while the initial results showed general consistency, there were four important 
crops that were not produced while they are in the current crop pattern. Increasing the 
price of these crops pushed the model to produce them in amounts that are similar to their 
historical levels while not causing major reductions in other crops from their historical 
amounts. This new set of the prices is called, the adjusted prices, and uses observed 
prices for all but the four crops. The adjusted prices lead to increased total revenue over 
the base model that used estimated market prices. 
The second part of the chapter compares four scenarios that use two different 
algorithms to help the government to achieve its objectives. The first algorithm is 
reallocated irrigation water policy (RIWP) where the government relies only on water 
restrictions as an instrument to alter farmer behavior. The second algorithm is an 
integrated irrigation water management policy (IIWMP) where the government relies on 
water restrictions and crop-specific taxes and subsidies to alter farmer behavior. Each 
algorithm is applied to both the historic market price and adjusted price sets of crop 
prices. 
Initially two pairs of the scenarios are considered. The first pair is RIWP and 
IIWMP algorithm using estimated market prices, while the second pair is RIWP and 
 77 
 
IIWMP algorithm using the adjusted prices. The first pair of scenarios show that if the 
government only relies on only constraints on irrigation water to align farmers’ behavior 
with governent objectives farmers will not produce enough to satisfy the food security 
objective. On the other hand, the second pair  of scenarios show that if the government 
introduces a system of crop specific taxes and subsidies, this can lead farmers to produce 
a level of output that satisfies food security constraint and reduces irrigation water used.  
4.2. Results for Riyadh Regional Model 
 The Riyadh region is the largest administration region in Saudi Arabia, 
representing around 30 percent of the national agricultural irrigated area on average 
between 2009 and 2013. The region has several aquifers, and the quality of these aquifers 
range between not saline to high saline. Falatah et al. (1999) find the average water 
salinity is 3.65 dS m-1 and the study adopted their result to calculate the gross irrigation 
water requirement for the Riyadh region. 
 The analysis used a five-year average data set to observe current crop patterns. 
Assuming decision-makers are rational and aim to maximize profits by allocating their 
limited resources, the results of the observed crop mix suggests that farmers achieved 
profits of SAR 5.04 billion, consumed 5.8 BCM of irrigation water, and used 234.8 
thousand hectares of land resources. Four plants groups consumed the irrigation water: 
cereals, vegetables, fodder, and fruits. The fodder group consumed 57.35 percent of all 
irrigation water, while the fruit group consumed 26.5 percent, the cereal group consumed 
8.07 percent while the vegetable group consumed 8.08 percent. The model aims to 
replicate the actual crop pattern and output for Riyadh using average prices and historic 
average water consumption.  
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 Model Result Compared to Historic Average 4.2.1.
 Table 4.1 shows the results of the regional model for the Riyadh region using 
market prices. The objective function maximizes profits, which increased from SAR 5.04 
billion in the observed crop pattern to SAR 5.19 billion. Profit increased by just 2.2 
percent while total revenue decreased by 14.5 percent. Farmers reallocated limited 
resources with a 13.7 percent decrease of cropland used and a 7 percent decrease in 
irrigation water. Therefore, the decrease in the irrigation water consumption was mainly a 
result of decreased cropland and adjustments in crop mix.  
 In detail, the optimal solution suggests eliminating all of the wheat, barley, maize, 
and tomatoes (GH) to optimize profit. The rest of the crops fluctuate between a maximum 
of 10 percent and a minimum of 13 percent of the current crop mix. This fluctuation is 
mainly due to some assumptions of the model. These include: treating the region as a 
single large farm, using an average quality of water for the entire region, and assuming 
strict short term profit maximizing behavior. In addition the aggregate constraint may 
have limited adjustments. This constraint allows some crop diversification but it limits 
the scope for large shifts. For instance, alfalfa and other fodder increased by 1.1 and 4.4 
percent respectively. These results are very close to the current crop while cucumbers 
(GH) increased by 10.5 percent and sorghum decreased by 13.6 percent. Even though the 
aggregate constraint puts the optimal crop pattern close to the current crop mix; there 
were four crops not included in the optimal crop pattern because these crops had a 
negative net return. 
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Table  4-1 Crop pattern based on observed and optimization with different level of prices 
 Current Crop Solution Optimal Solution (Wholesale Piece) 
Optimal Solution 
(Indirect Subsidies) 
Return 9,544,190,906.7 9,113,007,023 9,709,247,678 
Profit 5,038,510,451.3 5,194,002,128 5,250,248,433 
Cropland 234,877.4 202,646.8 234,499.8 
Water irrigation 5,814,121,725.4 5,405,852,254 5,814,121,725 
Crops 
Crop Area 
Observed 
(ha) 
Wholesale 
price   SAR 
Optimal 
Crop Area 
(ha) 
Different 
from Area 
% 
Indirect 
Subsidies 
SAR 
Optimal 
Crop Area 
(ha) 
Different 
from Area 
% 
Cereals Group 
Wheat 30,646.2 1,120.0 0 -100 656.0 30,184.8 -1.5 
Barley 570.0 1,115.0 0 -100 755.0 584.7 +2.6 
Sorghum 207.4 1,880.7 179.1 -13.6 0.0 189.9 -8.5 
Maize 1,852.2 1,101.0 0 -100 713.0 1,850.9 -0.1 
Millet 0.0 1,226.0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sesame 0.0 5,357.0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other Cereal 40.2 2,506.0 38.8 -3.4 0.0 40.6 +1.0 
Vegetables Group 
Tomato (OF) 3,735.1 2,368.0 3,927.1 
 
+5.1 0.0 3,822.4 +2.3 
Tomato (GH) 1,734.5 2,368.0 0.0 -100 680.0 1,463.0 -15.7 
Eggplant 1,790.4 2,060.0 1,762.6 -1.6 0.0 1,811.2 +1.2 
Squash (OF) 3,003.0 3,620.0 2,965.7 -1.2 0.0 3,006.4 +0.1 
Squash (GH) 21.2 3,620.0 22.0 +3.8 0.0 22.0 +3.8 
Cucumber (OF) 191.2 3,088.0 190.3 -0.5 0.0 190.5 -0.3 
Cucumber (GH) 1,432.0 3,088.0 1582 +10.5 0.0 1,582.0 +10.5 
Okra (OF) 1,122.2 8,462.0 1,062.2 -5.3 0.0 1,139.3 +1.5 
Carrots (OF) 1,680.8 2,048.0 1,670.1 -0.6 0.0 1,702.3 +1.3 
Potato (OF) 4,512.6 1,406.0 4,602.0 +2.0 0.0 4,582.9 +1.6 
Dray onion (OF) 1,091.4 1,590.0 1,119.6 +2.6 0.0 1,096.3 +0.5 
Melon (OF) 10,924.4 2,658.0 10,700.3 -2.1 0.0 10,775.3 -1.4 
Watermelon (OF) 12,983.6 2,728.0 13,166.6 +1.4 0.0 12,977.4 0.0 
Other Vegetable 
(OF) 
9,367.4 4,401.0 9,558.9 +2.0 0.0 9,603.8 +2.5 
Other Vegetable 
(GH) 805.2 4,401.0 767.0 -4.7 0.0 767.0 -4.7 
Fodder Group 
Alfalfa 60,820.0 1,346.0 61,509.8 +1.1 0.0 61,158.7 +0.6 
Other fodder 33,511.2 1,532.0 34,987.5 +4.4 0.0 33,113.1 -1.2 
Fruits Group 
Dates plum 42,419.6 9,219.0 42,419.6 0.0 0.0 42,419.6 0.0 
Citrus 3,374.4 3,043.0 33,74.4 0.0 0.0 33,74.4 0.0 
Grapes 2,806.8 5,028.0 28,06.8 0.0 0.0 28,06.8 0.0 
Other Fruit 4,234.4 4,928.0 42,34.4 0.0 0.0 42,34.4 0.0 
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 Possible Explanation of Solution 4.2.2.
 The best explanation for the absence of these crops in the model when they were 
actually produced is that observed market prices used in the model do not fully reflect 
actual prices received by farmers when hidden subsidies are present. Prices in the 
dissertation were obtained from two sources. The first source is the international import 
price for grains and fodder. The second source is average wholesale prices for vegetables 
and fruits. While wholesale prices most likely includes domestic subsidies to farmers, it 
is less likely that international import prices fully reflect domestic subsidies to farmers. 
 The Saudi government provides direct and indirect subsidies (implicit subsidies); 
Chapter 2 explained all direct subsidies. Howevert, farmers also receive different kinds of 
indirect subsidies, such as for fuel and electricity, to support crop production. These 
indirect subsidies could affect farmers’ decisions, but the indirect subsidies do not show 
in production costs. For instance, the government subsidizes fuel and electricity wherein 
farmers pay a lower price for these utilities, so the full price of fuel and electricity do not 
show in production costs. This section estimates the minimum implicit subsidies that 
farmers receive indirectly through estimate the new prices set. The aim of the new prices 
set that lead farmer to produce observed crop pattern and output with historical water use. 
 Indirect subsidies are estimated for the four crops in a two step process. First, 
estimate the price that causes the crops to show in the observed crop pattern and then 
estimate the implicit subsidy as the difference between this price and the market price. In 
the first step, a GAMS program is used to estimate the adjusted prices by running the 
model at different price levels for one crop of the four crops until the crop is included in 
the optimal solution at a level similar to that observed. For instance, wheat is observed in 
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the optimal solution when the price of the crop increases to SAR 1,776 (470.93 USD). 
Similarly, the adjusted price for barley, maize, and tomatoes are grown in greenhouses 
are SAR 1,870 (498.66 USD), 1,814 (483.73 USD), and 3,048 (812.80 USD), 
respectively.  
 The second step is estimating the indirect subsidy for each crop. The difference 
between the observed price per ton and the adjusted price per ton represents the minimum 
implicit subsidies farmers received indirectly. Implicit subsidies are SAR 656 (174.93 
USD), 755 (201.33 USD), 713 (190.13 USD), and 680 (181.33 USD) for wheat, barley, 
maize, and tomatoes are grown in greenhouses, respectively. These indirect subsidy 
values represent the minimum implicit subsidies needed to achieve production at amounts 
similar to those observed, as there may be some implicit subsidies that are not calculated. 
However, comparing the implicit subsidies per ton with the average cost per ton shows 
that farmers receive a high number of implicit subsidies. The estimation shows that 
implicit subsidies represent 46.75, 45.54, 46.65, and 22.37 percent of adjusted prices for 
wheat, barley, maize, and tomatoes are grown in greenhouses, respectively. The results 
show that grains receive more than 40 percent of their average cost per ton as implicit 
subsidies, which encourages farmers to produce these crops. 
 43BModel Result with new adjusted prices 4.2.3.
 The implicit subsidies lead to changes in prices, and the changes have a 
significant effect on farmers’ decision to allocate limited resources to grow the crops. 
Importantly, all adjusted prices for crops are either at the same level or a higher level than 
they are in the observed price set so an increase in crop production should occur. The 
new optimal solution with indirect subsidies generates 5.25 billion SAR in profit 
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compared to 5.03 billion SAR under the historic crop pattern. The new optimization 
solution has higher profit by 4.2 percent and higher total return by 1.73 percent than the 
profit and total return of the current crop mix. Increases in profit and total return largely 
result from the increase in the price of wheat, barley, maize and tomato (GH). 
Importantly the new optimal solution is similar to the observed crop mix. Adjusted prices 
lead the farmer to reallocate available resources to maximize the profit, while the 
aggregate constraint succeeds in keeping the difference between the observed crop 
pattern and now crop pattern within an acceptable range of fluctuation. 
 The new optimal solution used the same amount of irrigation water used and 377 
less hectares of cropland when compared to the current crop mix. Table 4.1 shows that 
the wheat area is less than the observed area by about 1.5 percent, while barley is greater 
by 2.6 percent. The optimal solution results in almost the same amount maize, while 
tomatoes grown in a greenhouse were less by about 15.7 percent.  
 In general, this crop mix is the closest simulation to the observed crop pattern as 
the new adjusted prices almost replicate the actual crop pattern and output for Riyadh. 
This suggests the model is a good representation of actual condition. As the Saudi 
government applies identical agricultural policies in all regions of Saudi Arabia, the 
dissertation assumes that each region receives the same amount of indirect subsidies for 
the same crops. This allows the use of adjusted prices from the Riyadh region in all other 
regions. Based on this assumption, the study includes two sets of prices: market prices, 
collected from different sources, and adjusted prices, representing the market price plus 
indirect subsidies.  
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4.3. Scenarios using Estimated Market Prices 
 The study includes two status quo points, as shown in Figure 4.3, with each point 
representing a specific level of food security that corresponds to historic levels of 
production. Each status quo point reflects the government’s solution to its problem of 
minimizing water needed to produce a target level of food security. Because different 
crop price sets are used in the two cases, different levels of total revenue occur. In both 
instances, while crop prices differ, the level of food output is determined by the historic 
average output of crops over a five year interval. The first status quo point can be 
described as the current situation, using observed prices, where total irrigation water used 
is 13.131 BCM, and total revenue is 20.815 billion SAR. The second status quo point 
assumes the use of adjusted prices where total irrigation water used remains at 13.131 
BCM, but total revenue is 21.7 billion SAR because crop prices are higher or at least as 
high as for the first status quo point. These points are the references for comparing 
scenario results since they can be thought of as reflecting current policy and behavior. 
 As the study covers six regions and uses a five-year average data set to illustrate 
the observed crop pattern for each region, total irrigation water used is distributed among 
the regions as follows: Riyadh 44.3 percent, Qassem 18.8 percent, Eastern Province 7.5 
percent, Tabuk 5.7 percent, Hail 12.5 percent, and Jouf 11.2 percent. The distribution of 
irrigation water among plant groups is as follows: cereal group 13.0 percent, vegetable 
group 5.9 percent, fodder group 43.5 percent, and fruit group 37.6 percent. Meanwhile, 
the total revenue distributed among the regions is as follows: Riyadh 45.9 percent, 
Qassem 17.7 percent, Eastern Province 13.0 percent, Tabuk 5.3 percent, Hail 9.2 percent, 
and Jouf 8.9 percent. The total cropland of the entire region is 610.4 thousand hectares. 
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The cultivated area distributed among regions is as follows: Riyadh 38.5 percent, Qassem 
16.6 percent, Eastern Province 8.8 percent, Tabuk 7.3 percent, Hail 13.4 percent, and 
Jouf 15.5 percent. 
 The next sections show the result of applying the RIWP and IIWMP algorithms to 
prices based on observed market conditions. Two scenarios are considered – one for each 
algorithm. The first scenario represents the results from the RIWP algorithm based on the 
observed price set, while the second scenario presents the results from the IIWMP 
algorithm using the same price set. 
 Scenario One: RIWP algorithm 4.3.1.
 Scenario one shows that the government reduces the total irrigation water 
consumption by reallocating the irrigation water among the regions, but does not take any 
feedback from farmers’ actions. Government first obtains a feasible solution that 
optimizes its objective function by minimizing the total irrigation water used among the 
six regions while satisfying the total revenue constraint. The government then uses this 
quantity of irrigation water used as a constraint in the six regional farm models to alter 
farm choices through the RIWP algorithm.  
 Table 4.2 shows the results, with the first column of the table illustrating the 
current crop mix, while the second column shows results from the RIWP algorithm. Both 
the result from the government’s solution to the master problem and the solution of the 
farmer’s subproblem are presented. The government’s result suggests reducing irrigation 
water consumption to 11.518 BCM. The government then reallocates the irrigation water 
used among the regions as follows: Riyadh has 43.2 percent, Qassem 21.4 percent, 
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Eastern Province 5.6 percent, Tabuk 6.7 percent, Hail 10.5 percent, and Jouf 12.6 
percent. The government would expect the farmers to use 540.0 thousand ha of cropland, 
and the farmers would reallocate the cropland among the crop groups as follows: cereal 
group 24.7 percent, vegetable group 17.1 percent, fodder group 25.8 percent, and fruit 
group 32.3 percent. 
 The farmers take the quantity of irrigation water as given, and then each farm 
solves a subproblem to maximize profits. Unfortunately, the farmers do not satisfy the 
government’s goals. In particular, the government aims to hold the total revenue from 
agricultural production at 20.815 billion, but the farmers only achieve 19.414 billion of 
the target return, or 93% of the target revenue. A 7 percent gap exists between the 
government’s desires and farmers’ actions. This gap causes a shortfall in the food 
security objective. This gap reflects farmers’ lack of interest in meeting the government’s 
goal of achieving a desired level of food security. For example, the reduction in irrigation 
water among the regions led to a 61 percent decline in wheat production and a 47 percent 
drop in tomato production. On the other hand, the redistribution also led to increases of 
the other vegetables by more than 60 percent. All these changes happened because the 
farmers focused on maximizing profit, while the government failed to motivate the 
farmer to adopt the food security objective. 
 While the government’s solution for the master problem led to an 11.26 percent 
reduction of irrigation water consumption, compared to the quantity consumed in the 
observed crop mix, the total consumption by farmers decreased by 12.28 percent. 
Farmers actually use less water than was allocated, and the farmers produce less output 
than the government wants. Also, the farmers use irrigation water to produce different 
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crop mix then the government desires. While the government assumed that the crop 
pattern farmers adopted would be similar to the crop pattern that the government 
determined from solving the master problem (leader problem), the result shows that 
farmers do not satisfy the government’s objectives. 
 Scenario Two: IIWMP algorithm 4.3.2.
 The government uses the same irrigation water constraint as in the first solution, 
but also provides crop specific taxes and subsidies for each region to motivate farmers to 
produce the crop mix government desires. In this case, the government first solves the 
leadership problem as before and determines the quantity of irrigation water used for 
each region. Each region, which is represented as a single farm, then solves the farm 
problem to maximize profits as before. Now however, if the farms’ optimal solution does 
not  provide the government’s desired level of food security and crop mix, the 
government then adopts a feedback policy of new crop prices that motivates the farmers 
to satisfy its objectives and the region problem is resolved. This process is repeated until 
the output of eh six region models converges with the government solution.  
 Table 4.2 shows the result of the process. The third column of Table 4.2 shows 
that the optimal solution of this scenario minimizes irrigation water at 9.415 BCM and 
reaches the total revenue target. The IIWMP algorithm runs many times to reach this 
result, and the solution suggests reducing the irrigation water consumption to 9.415 BCM 
and the cropland to 500.4 thousand hectares. In each iteration farmers respond by using 
new prices and the limited amount of irrigation water to maximize their profits. Farmers 
determined the final amount of cropland for each crop in each region, as shown in Table 
4.2. To summarize the result, the total crop area was distributed as follows: Riyadh 152.1 
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thousand hectares, Qassem 101.1 thousand hectares, Eastern Province 26.5 thousand 
hectares, Tabuk 44.4 thousand hectares, Hail 81.6 thousand hectares, and Jouf 94.5 
thousand hectares. More precisely, the solution suggests encouraging farmers in Riyadh 
to allocate the total crop area as follows: 36.1 percent vegetables, 28.7 percent fodder, 
and 34.7 percent fruits. Meanwhile, the distribution of the total crop area in Qassem 
would be cereal 30.4 percent, 43.3 fruits, fodder 13.9 percent, and vegetables 12.4 
percent. These two regions represent around 50 percent of the total crop area, as 
suggested by the solution. However, the solution focuses on reducing the fodder area to 
reduce irrigation water consumption, which was observed in the distribution of cropland 
among the plant groups. For instance, the fodder cropland represents 30.9 percent of the 
total crop for the current crop pattern while the solution suggests reducing the fodder 
cropland to 17 percent of the total cropland of the solution. 
 46BComparison of the First Two Scenarios to Status Quo  4.3.3.
 The status quo point shows the current crop mix used 13.13 BCM of water and 
the total revenue was 20.7 billion SAR. Scenario (1) used the RIWP algorithm to reduce 
the irrigation water consumption to 11.518 BCM, but it did not achieve the government’s 
goal of achieving the target revenue. The total revenue fell to 19.4 billion SAR indicating 
that farms cannot achieve the desired food security level. Scenario (1) also shows the 
farmers’ crop mix does not match up the government’s crop mix desire, indicating that 
the irrigation water constraint alone is not enough to change the farm's choices. So, the 
weakness of this algorithm is that no motivation affects the farmers’ decision to adopt the 
government’s goals. Scenario (2) shows how additional government intervention in the 
 88 
 
form of crop and region specific taxes and subsidies can reduce the irrigation water used 
and satisfy the total revenue constraint. 
 Scenario (2) used IIWMP algorithm shows the government uses policies besides 
the irrigation water constraint. The scenario suggests that each region requires region 
specific policies to motivate farmers to satisfy the government’s objectives. For instance, 
the solution suggests the government should deal with the Hail region to impose taxation 
on barley, other cereals, alfalfa, and other fodder, while imposing subsidies for wheat and 
potatoes. These combinations of policies lead guide the farmer to satisfy the 
government’s objectives. 
4.4. Scenarios Using Adjusted Prices 
 Adjusted prices result from the question of, why is there a difference between the 
optimal crop mix and the observed current crop mix. The answer is that farms can receive 
hidden or indirect subsidies that motivate the farms to adopt the observed crop mix. 
Estimates of indirect subsidies for the Riyadh region are calculated and generalized to 
other regions. Total revenues are then estimated based on adjusted prices which equal the 
wholesale price plus the indirect subsidies. Thus, the total revenue for status quo point 2 
is 20.815 billion SAR, which establishes the new target level of food security that is 
higher than the first status quo point. 
 Therefore, the initial point, in this case, is that the agricultural crop area in the six 
regions consumes 13.131 BCM and produces 21.7 billion SAR of the total product 
revenue, as shown in Table 4.3. The two scenarios using this price set follow the same 
procedure as above case would have the same procedure of the first case, which means 
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the RIWP algorithm is applied in the third scenario while the IIWMP algorithm is applied 
in the fourth scenario. 
 Scenario Three: RIWP algorithm 4.4.1.
 Again, the government uses restrictions on irrigation water to modify farmers’ 
choice. The scenario assumes that adjusted prices are applied to all regions, and uses the 
RIWP algorithm. Table 4.3 shows the results indicating that the farmers (i.e., followers) 
do not satisfy the government’s objectives. The solution for the leader problem suggests 
that the government can reduce the irrigation water to 11.711 BCM when it reallocates 
the irrigation water used among all regions and still meet its food security target. The 
government distributes irrigation water among the regions as follows: Riyadh 5.437 
BCM, Qassem 2.158 BCM, Eastern Province 0.891 BCM, Tabuk 0.681 BCM, Hail 1.113 
BCM, and Jouf 1.341 BCM. Farmers then take the quantity of irrigation water as a given 
and solve their subproblem to maximize their individual profits. The results show that the 
farmers’ decision does not meet the target revenue. Total revenue produced by the 
farmers would be 20.677 billion SAR, which is 4.7 percent less than the target revenue, 
while irrigation water consumption is the amount allocated. This gap shows that the 
higher price regime associated with adjusted prices fails to motivate the farmers to adopt 
the government’s objectives. Therefore, the government needs to review the subsidy 
policy to guide farmers to the government’s objectives. On the other hand, the RIWP 
algorithm with adjusted prices resulted in greater total revenue than in Scenario 1 
reducing the gap between the government wishes and farm decisions. Some regions (e.g., 
Jouf) matched the crop pattern suggested by the government, whereas others (e.g., 
Qassem and Eastern Province) matched up to around 90 percent or more. 
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 Scenario Four: IIWMP algorithm 4.4.2.
 This scenario used the IIWMP algorithm, in which the government uses both 
irrigation water constraints and specific crop policies to better align farm-level decisions 
with government objectives. The integration between controlling irrigation water use and 
agricultural policies encourages farmers to align objectives for both levels. The third 
column of Table 4.3 shows the results of this scenario. 
 The solution suggests that government sets the irrigation water availability at 
10.264 BCM. With this solution, the government distributes irrigation water among the 
regions as follows: Riyadh 4.363 BCM, Qassem 2.158 BCM, Eastern Province 0.891 
BCM, Tabuk 0.618 BCM, Hail 1.113 BCM, and Jouf 1.121 BCM. Furthermore, the 
government should pay about 1.926 billion SAR in net subsidies to encourage farmers to 
meet its objectives. The total subsidies would be distributed among the crop groups as 
follows: cereal group 46.6 percent, vegetable group 42.1 percent, and the fodder group 
11.27 percent. Hence, the solution suggests providing a subsidy for fodder in Riyadh, 
while imposing a tax on growing fodder in the Eastern Province and Hail regions. This 
mix of agricultural policies could lead the farmers to minimize their irrigation water 
consumption and achieve the government’s target total revenue of total agricultural 
production. 
 Comparison of the Second Two Scenarios to Status Quo  4.4.3.
 Based on the adjusted price set, the status quo shows the current crop mix requires 
13.13 BCM of water, and a total revenue of 21.7 billion SAR. The current level of total 
revenue represents the status quo solution with indirect subsidies. However, when the 
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government controls the irrigation water used to alter the farmers choice as shown in 
scenario (3), irrigation water consumption is reduced to 11.71 BCM, but total revenue 
decreases to 20.677 billion SAR. This reduction in the total revenue represents a decline 
in the level of food security. Thus, only controlling irrigation water use does not achieve 
the government’s target revenue goal. 
 On the other hand, Scenario (4) used IIWMP algorithm where the government 
uses price adjustment policies in addition to an irrigation water constraint. The scenario 
uses region specific policies to motivate farmers to satisfy the government’s objectives. 
The result of these integrated policies is: achieving the total revenue target, reducing 
irrigation water used and increasing the farm-level profit. Irrigation water used is reduced 
to 10.264 BCM, and the farm profit increases to 16.8 billion SAR, whereas the status quo 
crop mix has  profits of 12.6 billion SAR. The increased profit reflects the subsidies 
provided by the government that are required to achieve its desired crop mix and level of 
food security.   
 Also, cropland decreases as a response to irrigation water consumption constraints 
in scenario (3) or integrated policies as in scenario (4). The difference in the cropland 
used between the two scenarios is not significant. Thus, the major factor that leads to 
minimize irrigation water used and maximize the total revenue is the integrated policies. 
4.5. Comparison of Four Scenarios 
 The four scenarios reflect combinations of two sets of prices (observed and 
adjusted) and two solution algorithms (one using only water restrictions and one using an 
iterative price adjustment process and water restrictions). While specific comparisons 
among all four scenarios are difficult because each is based on different starting points 
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some generalizations can be made. The first is that while water restrictions alone can lead 
to significant reductions in water use while in principle maintaining current levels of food 
security, the principle agent problem associated with a mismatch between government 
and farm level objectives leads to food security objectives not being achieved. This is 
true for both price regimes. 
 To address the principal-agent problem the government must find a way to align 
the two leaves of objectives. One way to do this is to adopt region and crop specific taxes 
and subsidies to better link farm level profits with government food security desires. The 
algorithm that uses this approach is able to lead farms to produce the government’s target 
crop mix while significantly reducing water use, but at a cost of a net transfer to farmers 
from government. While a tax and subsidy approach may not be the only way to resolve 
the principal agent problem, it does provide an estimate of what it might cost Saudi 
Arabia to achieve the current level of food security while reducing water use. 
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Table  4-2 Detail result for crop pattern for all-region at the first case where total revenue 
estimated base on the wholesale prices. 
 
Current 
Crop 
Pattern 
RIWP Algorithm result 
IIWMP Algorithm result 
Leader solution Follower solution 
Total Revenue (Billion SAR) 20.815 20.815 19.414 20.815 
Profit (Billion SAR) 11.751 11.770 12.290 12.259 
Total irrigation water used (BCM) 13.131 11.652 11.518 9.415 
Total Cropland (ha) 610,409.2 543,957.0 464,700.4 500,393.5 
Riyadh 
Total Revenue (Billion SAR) 9.556 9.219 8.656 8.815 
Profit (Billion SAR) 5.051 4.959 5.148 5.044 
Total irrigation water used (BCM) 5.814 5.037 5.037 3.237 
Total Cropland (ha) 234,877.4 195,716.7 187,827.8 152,153.2 
 Cropland Leader Cropland Follower Cropland Cropland 
Subsidies 
(+/-) 
Cereal Group 
Wheat 30,646.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Barley 570.0 552.8 0.0 552.8 1,164.0 
Sorghum 207.4 179.1 189.9 179.1 79.3 
Maize 1,852.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Millet 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sesame 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other Cereal 40.2 38.8 40.6 38.8 0.0 
Vegetables Group 
Tomato 3,735.1 3,927.1 3,822.4 3,927.1 0.0 
Tomato (GH) 1,734.5 1,873.0 0.0 1,873.0 762.0 
Eggplant 1,790.4 1,762.6 1,811.2 1,762.6 0.0 
Squash 3,003.0 2,965.7 3,006.4 2,965.7 0.0 
Squash (GH) 21.1 21.0 22.0 21.0 0.0 
Cucumber 191.2 190.3 190.5 190.3 0.0 
Cucumber (GH) 1,432.0 1,411.0 1,582.0 1,411.0 0.0 
Okra 1,122.2 1,062.2 1,139.3 1,062.2 0.0 
Carrots 1,680.8 1,670.1 1,702.3 1,670.1 0.0 
Potato 4,512.6 4,602.0 4,582.9 4,602.0 0.0 
Dry Onion 1,091.4 1,119.6 1,096.3 1,119.6 0.0 
Melon 10,924.4 10,700.3 10,775.3 10,700.3 0.0 
Watermelon 12,983.6 13,166.6 12,977.4 13,166.6 1,772.0 
Other Vegetable 9,367.4 9,558.9 9,603.8 9,558.9 0.0 
Other Vegetable (GH) 805.2 847.0 767.0 847.0 0.0 
Fodder Group 
Alfalfa 60,820.0 52,245.9 61,158.7 8,682.3 0.0 
Other Fodder 33,511.2 34,987.5 20,524.6 34,987.5 303.0 
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Fruits Group 
Dates 42,419.6 42,419.6 42,419.6 42,419.6 0.0 
Citrus 3,374.4 3,374.4 3,374.4 3,374.4 0.0 
Groups 2,806.8 2,806.8 2,806.8 2,806.8 0.0 
Other Fruits 4,234.4 4,234.4 4,234.4 4,234.4 0.0 
Qassem 
Total Revenue (Billion SAR) 3.674 3.799 3.442 3.797 
Profit (Billion SAR) 2.342 2.374 2.459 2.371 
Total irrigation water used (BCM) 2.470 2.496 2.362 2.165 
Total Cropland (ha) 101,254.4 101,254.4 80,815.5 101,254.4 
 Cropland Leader Cropland Follower Cropland Cropland Subsidies (+/-) 
Cereal Group 
Wheat 20,308.6 20,299.9 0.0 30,761.3 980.0 
Barley 68.2 0.0 270.8 0.0 0.0 
Sorghum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maize 1,355.0 0.0 172.2 0.0 0.0 
Millet 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sesame 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other Cereal 21.4 11.7 10.7 0.0 0.0 
Vegetables Group 
Tomato 112.4 119.1 102.1 119.1 0.0 
Tomato (GH) 588.4 780.0 0.0 780.0 520.0 
Eggplant 159.4 183.7 179.3 183.7 0.0 
Squash 892.5 872.1 869.4 872.1 0.0 
Squash (GH) 42.5 34.0 0.0 34.0 300.0 
Cucumber 44.5 41.6 42.3 41.6 0.0 
Cucumber (GH) 308.9 605.0 0.0 605.0 496.0 
Okra 135.6 178.5 158.3 178.5 0.0 
Carrots 1,389.0 1,422.3 1,478.3 1,422.3 0.0 
Potato 3,737.4 3,585.2 3,583.1 3,585.2 0.0 
Dry Onion 277.4 302.8 306.6 302.8 0.0 
Melon 672.2 714.8 676.4 714.8 0.0 
Watermelon 981.6 988.5 1,014.2 988.5 0.0 
Other Vegetable 2,466.0 2,738.9 2,718.8 2,738.9 0.0 
Other Vegetable (GH) 66.8 29.0 95.0 29.0 0.0 
Fodder Group 
Alfalfa 19,104.8 20,157.5 21,185.5 9,707.0 0.0 
Other Fodder 4,683.6 43,51.4 4,114.3 4,351.4 0.0 
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Fruits Group 
Dates 39,140.0 39,140.0 39,140.0 39,140.0 0.0 
Citrus 1,584.6 1,584.6 1,584.6 1,584.6 0.0 
Groups 1,662.2 1,662.2 1,662.2 1,662.2 0.0 
Other Fruits 1,451.4 1,451.4 1,451.4 1,451.4 0.0 
Eastern Province 
Total Revenue (Billion SAR) 2.713 2.53 2.861 3.013 
Profit (Billion SAR) 1.755 1.973 2.031 2.033 
Total irrigation water used (BCM) 0.991 0.651 0.651 0.651 
Total Cropland 53,762.2 26,470.7 26,077.9 26,470.7 
 Cropland Leader Cropland Follower Cropland Cropland Subsidies (+/-) 
Cereal Group 
Wheat 25,853.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Barley 113.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sorghum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maize 120.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Millet 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sesame 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other Cereal 182.6 189.0 189.0 189.0 0.0 
Vegetables Group 
Tomato 533.5 616.2 616.2 616.2 0.0 
Tomato (GH) 598.9 618.0 618.0 618.0 0.0 
Eggplant 105.6 137.5 137.5 137.5 0.0 
Squash 157.1 177.2 177.2 177.2 0.0 
Squash (GH) 43.1 44.0 44.0 44.0 0.0 
Cucumber 9.0 12.8 12.8 12.8 0.0 
Cucumber GH 192.6 390.0 0.0 390.0 1,746.0 
Okra 183.0 211.8 211.8 211.8 0.0 
Carrots 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2 0.0 
Potato 40.8 77.4 77.4 77.4 0.0 
Dry Onion 126.0 170.5 170.5 170.5 0.0 
Melon 150.0 139.8 139.8 139.8 0.0 
Watermelon 59.6 111.8 0.0 111.8 20.0 
Other Vegetable 1,358.8 1976.6 1,976.6 1,976.6 0.0 
Other Vegetable (GH) 220.0 592.0 592.0 592.0 0.0 
Fodder Group 
Alfalfa 2,695.0 0.0 109.0 0.0 0.0 
Other Fodder 2,476.6 2462.6 2,462.6 2,462.6 0.0 
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Fruits Group 
Dates 14,403.8 14,403.8 14,403.8 14,403.8 0.0 
Citrus 759.2 759.2 759.2 759.2 0.0 
Groups 149.0 149.0 149.0 149.0 0.0 
Other Fruits 3,219.2 3,219.2 3,219.2 3,219.2 0.0 
Tabuk 
Total Revenue (Billion SAR) 1.108 1.161 1.152 1.176 
Profit (Billion SAR) 0.493 0.534 0.545 0.556 
Total irrigation water used (BCM) 0.746 0.779 0.779 0.779 
Total Cropland 44,405.8 44,405.8 43,417.1 44,405.8 
 Cropland Leader Cropland Follower Cropland Cropland Subsidies (+/-) 
Cereal Group 
Wheat 19,486.6 18,104.6 16,966.0 18,118.6 34.0 
Barley 271.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sorghum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maize 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Millet 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sesame 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other Cereal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vegetables Group 
Tomato 534.9 588.1 570.8 588.1 0.0 
Tomato (GH) 77.3 44.0 90.0 90.0 812.0 
Eggplant 37.2 40.6 40.0 40.6 0.0 
Squash 24.7 32.7 33.1 32.7 0.0 
Squash (GH) 41.7 47.0 0.0 40.0 2,030.0 
Cucumber 18.3 17.8 18.7 17.8 0.0 
Cucumber (GH) 221.9 283.0 220.0 220.0 0.0 
Okra 19.8 18.9 20.9 18.9 0.0 
Carrots 3.6 5.1 4.6 5.1 0.0 
Potato 1,468.2 1,248.7 1,259.1 1,248.7 0.0 
Dry Onion 351.0 381.9 396.2 381.9 0.0 
Melon 164.2 184.4 185.6 184.4 0.0 
Watermelon 171.0 207.9 201.0 207.9 0.0 
Other Vegetable 555.6 761.7 757.9 761.7 0.0 
Other Vegetable (GH) 30.2 22.0 32.0 32.0 0.0 
Fodder Group 
Alfalfa 9,849.6 10,822.5 11,109.7 10,822.5 0.0 
Other Fodder 581.6 1,101.4 1,017.1 1,101.4 0.0 
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Fruits Group 
Dates 3,302.6 3,302.6 3,302.6 3,302.6 0.0 
Citrus 1,187.6 1,187.6 1,187.6 1,187.6 0.0 
Groups 1,227.4 1,227.4 1,227.4 1,227.4 0.0 
Other Fruits 4,775.8 4,775.8 4,775.8 4,775.8 0.0 
Hail 
Total Revenue (Billion SAR) 1.909 1.796 1.464 2.066 
Profit (Billion SAR) 1.153 0.957 1.124 1.212 
Total irrigation water used (BCM) 1.643 1.219 1.219 1.113 
Total Cropland 81,628.2 81,628.2 40,594.2 81,628.2 
 Cropland Leader Cropland Follower Cropland Cropland Subsidies (+/-) 
Cereal Group 
Wheat 22,721.8 43,778.9 0.0 48,068.1 480.0 
Barley 261.0 0.0 434.4 0.0 -55.0 
Sorghum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maize 13,422.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Millet 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sesame 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other Cereal 9.0 0.0 8.2 0.0 -56.0 
Vegetables Group 
Tomato 88.8 180.7 149.2 161.2 0.0 
Tomato (GH) 486.6 509.0 509.0 509.0 0.0 
Eggplant 236.2 269.3 244.5 272.9 0.0 
Squash 380.4 399.8 410.2 398.0 0.0 
Squash (GH) 4.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 
Cucumber 31.8 40.5 33.2 51.6 0.0 
Cucumber (GH) 49.6 96.0 96.0 96.0 0.0 
Okra 62.0 54.1 59.6 44.7 0.0 
Carrots 24.4 57.4 35.5 103.7 0.0 
Potato 4,843.4 6,021.4 0.0 6,451.7 968.0 
Dry Onion 335.6 233.2 314.9 110.3 0.0 
Melon 135.4 180.7 154.0 193.3 0.0 
Watermelon 3,318.4 3,281.6 3,442.0 2,870.7 0.0 
Other Vegetable 164.5 228.5 197.5 222.9 0.0 
Other Vegetable (GH) 14.7 14.0 14.0 14.0 0.0 
Fodder Group 
Alfalfa 8,280.0 0.0 7,855.9 0.0 -866.0 
Other Fodder 4,701.4 4,222.9 4,575.9 0.0 -982.0 
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Fruits Group 
Dates 17,214.0 17,214.0 17,214.0 17,214.0 0.0 
Citrus 1,441.2 1,441.2 1,441.2 1,441.2 0.0 
Groups 1,212.2 1,212.2 1,212.2 1,212.2 0.0 
Other Fruits 2,279.6 2,279.6 2,279.6 2,279.6 0.0 
Jouf 
Total Revenue (Billion SAR) 1.854 1.877 1.839 1.948 
Profit (Billion SAR) 0.958 0.972 0.983 1.043 
Total irrigation water used (BCM) 1.471 1.470 1.470 1.470 
Total Cropland 94,481.2 94,481.2 85,967.9 94,481.2 
 Cropland Leader Cropland Follower Cropland Cropland Subsidies (+/-) 
Cereal Group 
Wheat 49,967.0 49520.2 40,370.6 49,520.2 200.0 
Barley 646.6 975.4 0.0 975.4 315.0 
Sorghum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maize 435.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Millet 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sesame 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other Cereal 13.6 16.4 12.9 16.4 0.0 
Vegetables Group 
Tomato 649.5 599.2 672.8 599.2 0.0 
Tomato (GH) 114.9 108.0 108.0 108.0 0.0 
Eggplant 33.2 41.5 31.2 41.5 0.0 
Squash 102.5 179.5 89.4 179.5 0.0 
Squash (GH) 22.1 40.0 40.0 40.0 0.0 
Cucumber 23.5 28.3 29.6 28.3 0.0 
Cucumber (GH) 61.7 76.0 76.0 76.0 0.0 
Okra 88.4 103.3 81.7 103.3 0.0 
Carrots 74.8 56.1 52.9 56.1 0.0 
Potato 1,282.6 1772.4 1,305.9 1,772.4 0.0 
Dry Onion 1,188.8 854.6 1,246.8 854.6 0.0 
Melon 31.0 19.7 39.4 19.7 0.0 
Watermelon 35.8 70.7 94.3 70.7 0.0 
Other Vegetable 77.1 161.8 49.9 161.8 0.0 
Other Vegetable (GH) 4.9 8.0 8.0 8.0 0.0 
Fodder Group 
Alfalfa 12,603.4 12320.759 14,622.1 12,320.8 0.0 
Other Fodder 510.2 1015.526 522.4 1,015.5 0.0 
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Fruits Group 
Dates 5,215.0 5,215.0 5,215.0 5,215.0 0.0 
Citrus 716.8 716.8 716.8 716.8 0.0 
Groups 1,371.8 1,371.8 1,371.8 1,371.8 0.0 
Other Fruits 19,210.2 19,210.2 19,210.2 19,210.2 0.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 100 
 
Table  4-3 Detail result for crop pattern for all-region at the first case where total revenue 
estimated base on the support prices. 
 
Current Crop 
Pattern 
RIWP Algorithm result IIWMP Algorithm 
result Leader Solution Followers 
Solution 
Total Revenue (Billion SAR) 21.700 21.700 20.677 21.700 
Profit (Billion SAR) 12.636 12.413 12.658 16.836 
Total irrigation water used 
(BCM) 13.131 11.711 11.711 10.264 
Total Cropland (ha) 610,481.2 582,388.5 561,389.3 556,385.5 
Riyadh 
Total Revenue (Billion  
SAR) 9.751 9.592 9.227 9.560 
Profit (Billion  SAR) 5.246 5.215 5.201 5.475 
Total irrigation water used 
(BCM) 5.814 5.437 5.437 4.363 
Total Cropland (ha) 234,877.4 206,857.0 219,133.5 180,853.7 
Crops Cropland Subsidies (+/-) 
Leader 
Cropland (ha) 
Follower 
Cropland 
(ha) 
Subsidies 
(+/-) Cropland 
Subsidies 
(+/-) 
Cereal Group 
Wheat 30,646.2 656.0 0.0 30,184.8 656.0 0.0 656.0 
Barley 570.0 755.0 552.8 584.7 755.0 552.8 1,164.0 
Sorghum 207.4 0.0 179.1 189.9 0.0 179.1 79.3 
Maize 1,852.2 713.0 1,876.3 1,850.9 713.0 1,876.3 1,239.0 
Millet - - - - - - - 
Sesame - - - - - - - 
Other Cereal 40.2 0.0 38.8 40.6 0.0 38.8 1.0 
Vegetables Group 
Tomato 3,735.1 0.0 3,927.1 3,822.4 0.0 3,927.1 0.0 
Tomato (GH) 1,734.5 680.0 1,873.0 1,463.0 680.0 1,873.0 762.0 
Eggplant 1,790.4 0.0 1,762.6 1,811.2 0.0 1,762.6 0.0 
Squash 3,003.0 0.0 2,965.7 3,006.4 0.0 2,965.7 0.0 
Squash (GH) 21.1 0.0 21.0 22.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 
Cucumber 191.2 0.0 190.3 190.5 0.0 190.3 0.0 
Cucumber (GH) 1,432.0 0.0 1,411.0 1,582.0 0.0 1,411.0 0.0 
Okra 1,122.2 0.0 1,062.2 1,139.3 0.0 1,062.2 0.0 
Carrots 1,680.8 0.0 1,670.1 1,702.3 0.0 1,670.1 0.0 
Potato 4,512.6 0.0 4,602.0 4,582.9 0.0 4,602.0 0.0 
Dry Onion 1,091.4 0.0 1,119.6 1,096.3 0.0 1,119.6 0.0 
Melon 10,924.4 0.0 10,700.3 10,775.3 0.0 10,700.3 0.0 
Watermelon 12,983.6 0.0 13,166.6 12,977.4 0.0 13,166.6 1,772.0 
Other Vegetable 9,367.4 0.0 9,558.9 9,603.8 0.0 9,558.9 0.0 
Other Vegetable (GH) 805.2 0.0 847.0 767.0 0.0 847.0 0.0 
Fodder Group 
Alfalfa 60,820.0 0.0 61,509.8 61,158.7 0.0 35,506.5 0.0 
Other Fodder 33,511.2 0.0 34,987.5 17,746.8 0.0 34,987.5 303.0 
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Fruits Group 
Dates 42,419.6 0.0 42,419.6 42,419.6 0.0 42,419.6 0.0 
Citrus 3,374.4 0.0 3,374.4 3,374.4 0.0 3,374.4 0.0 
Groups 2,806.8 0.0 2,806.8 2,806.8 0.0 2,806.8 0.0 
Other Fruits 4,234.4 0.0 4,234.4 4,234.4 0.0 4,234.4 0.0 
Qassem 
Total Revenue (Billion  
SAR) 3.751 3.665 3.300 3.793 
Profit (Billion  SAR) 2.419 2.238 2.350 2.367 
Total irrigation water used 
(BCM) 2.470 2.158 2.158 2.158 
Total Cropland (ha) 101,254.4 101,254.4 75,433.3 101,254.4 
Crops Cropland Subsidies (+/-) 
Leader 
Cropland (ha) 
Follower 
Cropland 
(ha) 
Subsidies 
(+/-) Cropland 
Subsidies 
(+/-) 
Cereal Group 
Wheat 20,308.6 656.0 30,761.3 0.0 656.0 30,761.3 980.0 
Barley 68.2 755.0 277.7 0.0 755.0 277.7 985.0 
Sorghum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maize 1,355.0 713.0 0.0 0.0 713.0 0.0 713.0 
Millet - - - - - - - 
Sesame - - - - - - - 
Other Cereal 21.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.0 
Vegetables Group 
Tomato 112.4 0.0 119.1 119.1 0.0 119.1 0.0 
Tomato (GH) 588.4 0.0 780.0 0.0 680 780.0 523.0 
Eggplant 159.4 0.0 183.7 183.7 0.0 183.7 0.0 
Squash 892.5 0.0 872.1 872.1 0.0 872.1 0.0 
Squash (GH) 42.5 0.0 34.0 0.0 0.0 34.0 300.0 
Cucumber 44.5 0.0 41.6 41.6 0.0 41.6 0.0 
Cucumber (GH) 308.9 0.0 605.0 0.0 0.0 605.0 496.0 
Okra 135.6 0.0 178.5 178.5 0.0 178.5 0.0 
Carrots 1,389.0 0.0 1,422.3 1,422.3 0.0 1,422.3 0.0 
Potato 3,737.4 0.0 3,585.2 3,585.2 0.0 3,585.2 0.0 
Dry Onion 277.4 0.0 302.8 302.8 0.0 302.8 0.0 
Melon 672.2 0.0 714.8 714.8 0.0 714.8 0.0 
Watermelon 981.6 0.0 988.5 988.5 0.0 988.5 0.0 
Other Vegetable 2,466.0 0.0 2,738.9 2,738.9 0.0 2,738.9 0.0 
Other Vegetable (GH) 66.8 0.0 29.0 95.0 0.0 29.0 0.0 
Fodder Group 
Alfalfa 19,104.8 0.0 9,430.2 16,001.1 0.0 9,430.2 0.0 
Other Fodder 4,683.6 0.0 4,351.4 4,351.3 0.0 4,351.4 0.0 
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Fruits Group 
Dates 39,140.0 0.0 39,140.0 39,140.0 0.0 39,140.0 0.0 
Citrus 1,584.6 0.0 1,584.6 1,584.6 0.0 1,584.6 0.0 
Groups 1,662.2 0.0 1,662.2 1,662.2 0.0 1,662.2 0.0 
Other Fruits 1,451.4 0.0 1,451.4 1,451.4 0.0 1,451.4 0.0 
Eastern Province 
Total Revenue (Billion  
SAR) 2.795 3.186 3.094 3.246 
Profit (Billion  SAR) 1.837 2.079 2.138 2.139 
Total irrigation water used 
(BCM) 0.991 0.891 0.891 0.891 
Total Cropland (ha) 53,762.2 53,762.1 53,423.5 53,762.2 
Crops Cropland Subsidies (+/-) 
Leader 
Cropland (ha) 
Follower 
Cropland 
(ha) 
Subsidies 
(+/-) Cropland 
Subsidies 
(+/-) 
Cereal Group 
Wheat 25,853.4 656.0 26,989.3 26,989.3 656.0 26,989.3 656.0 
Barley 113.2 755.0 181.2 181.2 755.0 181.2 755.0 
Sorghum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maize 120.0 713.0 120.9 186.6 713.0 120.9 713.0 
Millet - - - - - - - 
Sesame - - - - - - - 
Other Cereal 182.6 0.0 189.0 189.0 0.0 189.0 0.0 
Vegetables Group 
Tomato 533.5 0.0 616.2 616.2 0.0 616.2 0.0 
Tomato (GH) 598.9 0.0 618.0 618.0 680.0 618.0 0.0 
Eggplant 105.6 0.0 137.5 137.5 0.0 137.5 0.0 
Squash 157.1 0.0 177.2 177.2 0.0 177.2 0.0 
Squash (GH) 43.1 0.0 44.0 44.0 0.0 44.0 0.0 
Cucumber 9.0 0.0 12.8 12.8 0.0 12.8 0.0 
Cucumber GH 192.6 0.0 390.0 0.0 0.0 390.0 1,746.0 
Okra 183.0 0.0 211.8 211.8 0.0 211.8 0.0 
Carrots 12.2 0.0 12.2 12.2 0.0 12.2 0.0 
Potato 40.8 0.0 77.4 77.4 0.0 77.4 0.0 
Dry Onion 126.0 0.0 170.5 170.5 0.0 170.5 0.0 
Melon 150.0 0.0 139.8 139.8 0.0 139.8 0.0 
Watermelon 59.6 0.0 111.8 0.0 0.0 111.8 20.0 
Other Vegetable 1,358.8 0.0 1,976.6 1,976.6 0.0 1,976.6 0.0 
Other Vegetable (GH) 220.0 0.0 592.0 562.0 0.0 592.0 0.0 
Fodder Group 
Alfalfa 2,695.0 0.0 0.0 97.4 0.0 0.0 -246.0 
Other Fodder 2,476.6 0.0 2,462.6 2,462.6 0.0 2,462.6 0.0 
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Fruits Group 
Dates 14,403.8 0.0 14,403.8 14,403.8 0.0 14,403.8 0.0 
Citrus 759.2 0.0 759.2 759.2 0.0 759.2 0.0 
Groups 149.0 0.0 149.0 149.0 0.0 149.0 0.0 
Other Fruits 3,219.2 0.0 3,219.2 3,219.2 0.0 3,219.2 0.0 
Tabuk 
Total Revenue (Billion  
SAR) 1.197 1.185 1.178 1.154 
Profit (Billion  SAR) 0.582 0.570 0.578 0.543 
Total irrigation water used 
(BCM) 0.746 0.681 0.681 0.618 
Total Cropland (ha) 44,405.8 44,405.7 44,405.8 44,405.8 
Crops Cropland Subsidies (+/-) 
Leader 
Cropland (ha) 
Follower 
Cropland 
(ha) 
Subsidies 
(+/-) Cropland 
Subsidies 
(+/-) 
Cereal Group 
Wheat 19,486.6 656.0 21,144.0 21,815.4 656.0 22,972 656.0 
Barley 271.0 755.0 643.9 0.0 755.0 1,225.4 1,675.0 
Sorghum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maize 4.0 713.0 0.0 0.0 713.0 0.0 713.0 
Millet - - - - - - - 
Sesame - - - - - - - 
Other Cereal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vegetables Group 
Tomato 534.9 0.0 588.1 576.6 0.0 632.6 0.0 
Tomato (GH) 77.3 812.0 90.0 90.0 680 90.0 812.0 
Eggplant 37.2 0.0 40.6 37.9 0.0 45.6 0.0 
Squash 24.7 0.0 32.7 28.6 0.0 39.3 0.0 
Squash (GH) 41.7 0.0 40.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 2,030.0 
Cucumber 18.3 0.0 17.8 17.6 0.0 21.2 0.0 
Cucumber (GH) 221.9 0.0 220.0 220.0 0.0 220.0 0.0 
Okra 19.8 0.0 18.9 17.4 0.0 22.6 0.0 
Carrots 3.6 0.0 5.1 4.4 0.0 5.9 0.0 
Potato 1,468.2 0.0 1,248.7 1,262.7 0.0 1,261.9 0.0 
Dry Onion 351.0 0.0 381.9 383.7 0.0 366.3 0.0 
Melon 164.2 0.0 184.4 187.4 0.0 170.1 0.0 
Watermelon 171.0 0.0 207.9 196.9 0.0 222.8 0.0 
Other Vegetable 555.6 0.0 761.7 769.4 0.0 636.9 0.0 
Other Vegetable (GH) 30.2 0.0 32.0 32.0 0.0 32.0 0.0 
Fodder Group 
Alfalfa 9,849.6 0.0 7,153.1 7,347.5 0.0 4,692.9 0.0 
Other Fodder 581.6 0.0 1,101.4 924.7 0.0 1,214.7 0.0 
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Fruits Group 
Dates 3,302.6 0.0 3,302.6 3,302.6 0.0 3,302.6 0.0 
Citrus 1,187.6 0.0 1,187.6 1,187.6 0.0 1,187.6 0.0 
Groups 1,227.4 0.0 1,227.4 1,227.4 0.0 1,227.4 0.0 
Other Fruits 4,775.8 0.0 4,775.8 4,775.8 0.0 4,775.8 0.0 
Hail 
Total Revenue (Billion  
SAR) 2.102 1.965 1.782 2.052 
Profit (Billion SAR) 1.346 1.112 1.195 1.198 
Total irrigation water used 
(BCM) 1.643 1.113 1.113 1.113 
Total Cropland (ha) 81,628.2 81,628.6 74,512.0 81,628.2 
Crops Cropland Subsidies (+/-) 
Leader 
Cropland (ha) 
Follower 
Cropland 
(ha) 
Subsidies 
(+/-) Cropland 
Subsidies 
(+/-) 
Cereal Group 
Wheat 22,721.8 656.0 48,056.7 43,017.4 656.0 48,068.1 656.0 
Barley 261.0 755.0 0.0 461.9 755.0 0.0 -115.0 
Sorghum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maize 13,422.4 713.0 0.0 0.0 713.0 0.0 199.0 
Millet - - - - - - - 
Sesame - - - - - - - 
Other Cereal 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -106.0 
Vegetables Group 
Tomato 88.8 0.0 162.7 183.9 0.0 161.2 0.0 
Tomato (GH) 486.6 752.0 509.0 509.0 680.0 509.0 752.0 
Eggplant 236.2 0.0 274.5 268.4 0.0 272.9 0.0 
Squash 380.4 0.0 390.6 401.4 0.0 398.0 0.0 
Squash (GH) 4.8 0.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 
Cucumber 31.8 0.0 49.1 39.0 0.0 51.6 0.0 
Cucumber (GH) 49.6 0.0 96.0 96.0 0.0 96.0 0.0 
Okra 62.0 0.0 47.1 55.3 0.0 44.7 0.0 
Carrots 24.4 0.0 86.8 52.1 0.0 103.7 5,215.0 
Potato 4,843.4 0.0 6,366.1 0.0 0.0 6,451.7 385.0 
Dry Onion 335.6 0.0 129.0 251.8 0.0 110.3 0.0 
Melon 135.4 0.0 193.3 178.5 0.0 193.3 0.0 
Watermelon 3,318.4 0.0 2,975.6 3,336.1 0.0 2,870.7 0.0 
Other Vegetable 164.5 0.0 217.5 230.5 0.0 222.9 0.0 
Other Vegetable (GH) 14.7 0.0 14.0 14.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 
Fodder Group 
Alfalfa 8,280.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -946.0 
Other Fodder 4,701.4 0.0 0.0 3,356.7 0.0 0.0 -1,032.0 
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Fruits Group 
Dates 17,214.0 0.0 17,214.0 17,214.0 0.0 17,214.0 0.0 
Citrus 1,441.2 0.0 1,441.2 1,441.2 0.0 1,441.2 0.0 
Groups 1,212.2 0.0 1,212.2 1,212.2 0.0 1,212.2 0.0 
Other Fruits 2,279.6 0.0 2,279.6 2,279.6 0.0 2,279.6 0.0 
Jouf 
Total Revenue ( Billion 
SAR) 2.104 2.100 2.097 1.895 
Profit (Billion  SAR) 1.207 1.199 1.196 1.029 
Total irrigation water used 
(BCM) 1.471 1.431 1.431 1.121 
Total Cropland (ha) 94,481.2 94,480.7 94,481.2 94,481.2 
Crops Cropland Subsidies (+/-) 
Leader 
Cropland (ha) 
Follower 
Cropland 
(ha) 
Subsidies 
(+/-) Cropland 
Subsidies 
(+/-) 
Cereal Group 
Wheat 49,967.0 656.0 51,022.6 51,022.6 656.0 61,956.1 656.0 
Barley 646.6 755.0 795.5 795.5 755.0 795.5 755.0 
Sorghum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maize 435.8 713.0 0.0 0.0 713.0 0.0 713.0 
Millet - - - - - - - 
Sesame - - - - - - - 
Other Cereal 13.6 0.0 16.9 16.9 0.0 16.9 0.0 
Vegetables Group 
Tomato 649.5 0.0 587.8 587.8 0.0 587.8 0.0 
Tomato (GH) 114.9 890.0 108.0 108.0 680.0 108.0 890.0 
Eggplant 33.2 0.0 42.6 42.6 0.0 42.6 0.0 
Squash 102.5 0.0 188.9 188.9 0.0 188.9 0.0 
Squash (GH) 22.1 0.0 40.0 40.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 
Cucumber 23.5 0.0 27.8 27.8 0.0 27.8 0.0 
Cucumber (GH) 61.7 0.0 76.0 76.0 0.0 76.0 0.0 
Okra 88.4 0.0 106.4 106.4 0.0 106.4 0.0 
Carrots 74.8 0.0 57.1 57.1 0.0 57.1 0.0 
Potato 1,282.6 0.0 1,814.7 1,814.7 0.0 1,814.7 0.0 
Dry Onion 1,188.8 0.0 809.8 809.8 0.0 809.8 0.0 
Melon 31.0 0.0 17.7 17.7 0.0 17.7 0.0 
Watermelon 35.8 0.0 62.7 62.7 0.0 62.7 0.0 
Other Vegetable 77.1 0.0 173.9 173.9 0.0 173.9 0.0 
Other Vegetable (GH) 4.9 0.0 8.0 8.0 0.0 8.0 0.0 
Fodder Group 
Alfalfa 12,603.4 0.0 10,933.4 10,933.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other Fodder 510.2 0.0 1,077.6 1,077.6 0.0 1,077.6 0.0 
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Fruits Group 
Dates 5,215.0 0.0 5,215.0 5,215.0 0.0 5,215.0 0.0 
Citrus 716.8 0.0 716.8 716.8 0.0 716.8 0.0 
Groups 1,371.8 0.0 1,371.8 1,371.8 0.0 1,371.8 0.0 
Other Fruits 19,210.2 0.0 19,210.2 19,210.2 0.0 19,210.2 0.0 
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 ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS CHAPTER 5.
5.1. Introduction 
Initially the  chapter provides a synthesis and discussion of the analytical results of the 
dissertation provided in Chapter 4. The first part of the synthesis examines the extent to 
which it is possible to achieve the current level of food security while using less irrigation 
water, while the second part discusses possible trade-offs between the two government 
objectives of minimizing irrigation water use and maximizing food security. This 
discusion is extended using the concept of Pareto Optimality to see how the government 
could apply policies to better achieve a balance between its objectives. The remainder of 
the chapter provides some conclusions from the analysis, asesses limitaions of the 
research and suggests opportunities for future research that can extend the modelling 
approach. 
 Is it possible to maintain the current level of food security while 5.1.1.
reducing irrigation water use? 
The dissertation aims to find a balance between the goals of minimizing irrigation 
water use and satisfying a specific level of food security. To do this the dissertation used 
two algorithms, RIWP and IIWMP to achieve the objective. Results show that with the 
IIWMP algorithm it is possible to maintain the current level of food security and reduce 
irrigation water with appropriate government intervention. By government using a 
combination of policies that: adjust the distribution of irrigation water among regions, 
and impose crop specific subsidies, and taxes, both of the government's objectives can be 
achieved. For this to happen, government interventions must take into account farmers' 
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goal of maximizing profit, and policies must be designed so that farmers respond to the 
government's goals. 
Figure 5.1 shows the results of two “status quo” situations with the first one 
estimated using the current price set, while the second status quo is estimated with the 
adjusted price set. In each solution the level of food security is held constant while 
irrigation water is reduced. The figure shows that it is possible to maintain the current 
level of food security and achieve a greater reduction in irrigation water used by applying 
the IIWMP algorithm. The optimal solutions show the first status quo reduced irrigation 
water by 3.718 BCM while the second status quo reduced it 2.87 BCM.  
 
Figure  5-1 Optimal solution of the two status quo points. 
•        Represents the initial solution of the first status quo 
•    Represents the optimal solution with Government intervention of the first status 
quo 
•    Represents the initial solution of the second status quo 
•    Represents the optimal solution with g Government intervention of the second 
status quo 
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 The trade-off between the two objectives 5.1.2.
 As the dissertation adopted the a posteriori preference approach to solving the bi-
level multi-objective multi-follower situation, this section provides the results from 
running a number of different levels of food security (total product revenues) to show the 
trade-off between the two objectives. This provides a multi-solution option that can allow 
the leader, decision-maker, or government to select the best solution to maximize its 
utility. The dissertation also used the ε-constraints method, which provides a different 
level of solutions to solve the bi-level optimization problem. Thus, the dissertation finds a 
number of multi-solution options, but not all of these solutions are Pareto Optimal. 
 Figure 5.2 shows the results from running 23 scenarios using the IIWMP 
algorithm to minimize irrigation water while satisfy a range of total revenue constraints. 
The entire solution set meets the bi-level optimization condition, which is that a crop 
pattern suggested by the leader or government is adopted by the followers or farmers. 
The multi-solution option starts with a high total revenue target, which is 22.892 billion 
SAR and moves in steps to a low total revenue target, which is 18.313 billion SAR. The 
results show that increases in the level of food security require using more of the 
irrigation water. This result is obvious as irrigation water is one of the main inputs in the 
agricultural sector.  
 Figure 5.2 shows the two status quo points as well as the efficient solution points, 
and initial results for the RIWP and IIWMP algorithms. The result of the RIWP 
algorithm leads to a reduction of the irrigation water, but does not satisfy the food 
security target. Meanwhile, the IIWMP algorithm is more efficient, as the government 
reaches its total revenue target with less irrigation water at both status quo points. Not all 
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of these solutions are Pareto Optimal, but all of them are more efficient solutions than the 
status quo points. 
 
Figure  5-2 Comparing the result between the algorithms and shows the efficient solution 
of running bi-level multi-objective multi-follower for a different level of total revenue. 
•        Represent the initial of the first case 
•      Represent the solution of the first round of the algorithm of the first case 
•    Represent the optimal solution with g Government intervention of the first case 
•    Represent the initial of the second case 
•    Represent the solution of the first round of the algorithm of the second case 
•    Represent the optimal solution with g Government intervention of the second 
case 
 Figure 5.2 also shows the results of running the IIWMP algorithm scenario to 
optimize the allocation of irrigation water. A subset of these points is Pareto Optimal. As 
the study has two of the status quo points or levels of total revenues, one of them is 
Pareto Optimal while the other is not. The study does not find any Pareto Optimal 
solutions for the second status quo, which is the second level of total revenues, but the 
alternative solution is more efficient than the status quo point. Therefore, when the 
government decides to move to one of these solutions, the new optimal solution will 
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minimize the irrigation water use, but some farms/regions will experience less profit. On 
the other hand, the first status quo point has ten alternative solutions that satisfy the 
government’s objectives and does not harm any of its followers (i.e., farmers). 
 Figure 5.3 shows the set of optimal solutions and describes the relationship 
between the irrigation water used objective and the total revenue objective. The 
relationship between the two objectives is positive, which means the government wants 
to increase the level of food security, which will require more irrigation water. The model 
also provides a subset solution that could be more efficient than the two status quo points, 
as shown in Figure 5.2.  
 A subset of the solution can be a non-dominated solution (Pareto front), and all 
these points on this curve are strictly Pareto Optimal, as shown in Figure 5.3. In detail, 
the second status quo point is not Pareto Optimal, but some points increase the 
effectiveness of using irrigation water. Thus, if the government decides to develop the 
observed solution, one region would highly benefit. Using the first status quo point as the 
initial point, then the government has 10 alternative solutions that reduce irrigation water 
consumption and increase total revenues. However, Figure 5.3 shows the Pareto Optimal 
front, which involves points that lead to minimizing irrigation water while no 
regions/farmers experience reduced profits, as observed in Table 5.1. The best Pareto 
Optimal point occurs when target revenues are 21.019 billion SAR, and optimal irrigation 
consumption was 9.223 BCM. Under this scenario, all farmers/regions benefit. These 
scenarios demonstrate that the government has the opportunity to develop irrigation water 
management policies that reduce irrigation water consumption and increase the total 
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revenues from agricultural production.
 
Figure  5-3 Pareto Optimal Front for the first status quo point 
 
Table  5-1 All Pareto Optimal Compare to the status quo point of First Case 
 
Total 
Return 
(Billion 
SAR) 
Water 
Irrigation 
Consumption 
(BCM) 
Riyadh Qassem Eastern Tabuk Hail Jouf 
Current 
Crop 
Pattern 
20.815 13.131 5.051 2.342 1.755 0.493 1.153 0.958 
Scenario 1 22.892 12.103 5.934 2.367 2.139 0.580 1.198 1.211 
Scenario 2 22.684 11.770 5.890 2.367 2.139 0.580 1.198 1.211 
Scenario 3 22.475 11.447 5.886 2.367 2.139 0.543 1.198 1.088 
Scenario 4 22.267 11.129 5.807 2.367 2.139 0.543 1.198 1.029 
Scenario 5 22.059 10.811 5.685 2.367 2.139 0.543 1.198 1.029 
Scenario 6 21.851 10.493 5.563 2.367 2.139 0.543 1.198 1.029 
Scenario 7 21.643 10.176 5.441 2.367 2.139 0.543 1.198 1.029 
Scenario 8 21.435 9.858 5.320 2.367 2.139 0.543 1.198 1.029 
Scenario 9 21.227 9.540 5.198 2.367 2.139 0.543 1.198 1.029 
Scenario 10 21.019 9.223 5.076 2.367 2.139 0.543 1.198 1.029 
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  Policy to balance the government objectives while considering the 5.1.3.
farm objectives. 
Since there is a difference between farms’ objectives (maximize profit) and the 
government’s objectives (balance food security and irrigation water use), the government 
has to find policies that lead farmers to make a decision that satisfies the government 
objectives. The conflated objectives between the government and farmers present a 
principal-agent problem. Resolving the principal-agent problem requires supplemental 
policies, such as taxes and subsidies to alter farmers’ behavior. In particular, the IIWMP 
algorithm suggests the government can control irrigation water use among the regions 
and impose subsidies and taxes to encourage the farmers to adopt the government’s 
objectives.  
Model results show that it is possible to reduce irrigation water use from 2.863 to 
3.716 BCM while holding total revenue constant. The model assumes the government has 
control over irrigation water used in each region and imposes a policy to guide farmers in 
adopting its objectives. This reduction in water use results from government controlling 
irrigation water use, as well the government adopting policies that encourage farmers to 
produce new combinations of quantity and variety of crops to reach a specific level of 
food security. 
Thus, when the government determines the amount of irrigation water for each 
region, it also imposes policies that encourage farmers to meet government objectives. 
The policies used are combinations of subsidies and taxes that alter the profitability of 
different crops on a region by region basis. Thus, the government control irrigation water 
and used subsidies and taxes to control agricultural production to achieve its objectives. 
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Each region has unique irrigation water targets and policies. For example, Table 4.2 
shows that the solution for Hail region suggests the government impose subsidies for 
wheat of SAR 480 per ton and potatoes by SAR 968 per ton. On the other hand, the 
government imposes taxes on barley (SAR 55 per ton), other cereals (SAR 56), alfalfa 
(866 SAR), and other fodder (SAR 982). These subsidies motivate farmers to increase the 
production of wheat and potatoes while the taxes drive the farmers to stop growing crops 
that require a large amount of irrigation water to grow.  
However, a remaining question is how should the government apply the subsidies. 
One suggestion is the use of a price floor. The government provides the price floor for 
specific crops it would support in each region and then pays the difference between the 
price floor and market price to farmers. Further while the policies satisfy an national 
revenue constraint they may not ensure that no region is worse off without additional 
effort. In other words, are the new policies Pareto Optimal or not? 
5.2. Conclusion 
Dissertation results shows there is potential to reduce irrigation water use while 
improving the current level of food security if the government chooses the right policy 
mix. The IIWMP algorithm suggests a possible policy regime that reduces water use and 
achieves target total revenues. The IIWMP algorithm solves the bi-level, multi-objective, 
multi-follower programming problem that characterized the current situation in Saudi 
Arabia. The algorithm aims to minimize the irrigation water consumption that six regions 
in Saudi Arabia use while satisfying a total revenue target. The algorithm integrates the 
reallocation of irrigation water among the region and applies supplemental agricultural 
policies that fit each region. In other words, the algorithm suggests some policy set for 
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each region to encourage the farmers to adopt the government’s plan. For instance, the 
algorithm suggests imposing a tax on those farmers who grow fodder to motivate farmers 
to stop growing fodder. Meanwhile, the algorithm also suggests imposing subsidies to 
encourage farmers to grow specific crops, as was observed in most regions. 
The bi-level, multi-objective, multi-follower programming approach provides a 
means to examine alternative ways to achieve conflicting government objectives, where 
the government must rely on other agents to actually undertake the actions that will 
achieve its objectives. The models show that government relying solely on water 
restrictions can achieve a reductions in water use, but that a consequence of this is a 
reduction in food security, even though it may be possible to achieve the target level of 
output in principle. To address the underlying principal-agent problem the model uses 
taxes and policies to alter famer behavior, but it is possible to adopt other policy 
mechanisms that could achieve similar results. By explicitly using a regional model the 
potential for some regions to win or lose from government policy that focuses on national 
level objectives is made clear.  
 Based on these results, the government should invest in farmers in order to reduce 
the consumption of irrigation water through the efficient allocation of subsidies. The 
government has to deal with each region independently and with policies that help the 
government achieve its goals and farmers’ objectives in those regions, whereas 
agricultural policies in the past were symmetrically directed to all regions while the 
government neglected the comparative advantage of each region. 
5.3. Limitations 
The limitation of the study focus on a different parts, such as: 
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1- Ignores the livestock sector, which has a big impact on current crop choices. The 
result of the model shows the government would achieve the balance between 
minimizing the irrigation water used and food security through reduce growing 
the fodder group and feed grains. This has big implication for the livestock sector 
that are not considered. 
2- Assumes a single farm in each region. To make the model simpler, the study 
assumes each region represented as a single farm. With multiple farms variability 
in resources, management ability and objectives will complicate analysis. 
3- Assumes average water quality used in each region. In reality water quality varies 
considerably across regions, and with different levels of water quality crop yield 
functions are more variable. 
4- Does not explicitly consider the impact of the current agricultural policy. AsSaudi 
Arabia changes its set of policies these provide specific incentives or 
disincentives to grow particular crops and this in turn alters water use.. 
5- Use total revenue as a proxy for food security. In reality crop mixes that have 
equal market value can have very different nutritional content and market scope. 
Disaggregating the food security target into specific quantities of different crops 
would resolve this problem but would increase the complexity of the analysis. 
6- Government policy is restricted to two objectives of reducing irrigation water use 
and improving food security. In reality the government may have a larger set of 
objectives which could increase the potential for additional conflicts among 
government objectives. 
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5.4. Future Work   
The result of the research helped to open the mind and think on the topic from different 
cornel and domination. So, the following list shows the ideas could work in the future.    
1- Model refinements to address limitations. 
2- Expand the number of irrigation technologies because the current dissertation just 
uses the average irrigation efficiency of an irrigation system.  
3- Develop a broader definition of food security and investigate water needs for 
various level/mixes of crops.  
4- The bi-level multi-objective multi-follower optimization model in this study 
assumed that each region is independent in terms of its objective function, but this 
is not true. As the primary water source is groundwater and some regions share 
the aquifer, they share these constraints. Therefore, there is a water availability 
constraint among these regions. Future studies could explore this constraint, 
which may give different results than what this study obtained. 
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